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Abstract
This thesis studies questions from the fields of public economics and empirical banking.
The first chapter studies the question of how the design of pension system affects household
labour supply incentives. The effective marginal tax rate of the pension system is derived directly
from the households’ optimality conditions and decomposed into five components driven by inter-
and intra-generational redistribution, demographics, borrowing constraints, and insurance. I
provide quantitative results for the US, demonstrating that the effective tax rate lies significantly
below the statutory rate. Eliminating progressivity from the US pension schedule significantly
reduces effective marginal rates as it equalizes average and marginal replacement rates.
The second chapter considers the introduction of a Vickrey-style lifetime income tax in a
heterogeneous agent model with idiosyncratic risk. In a model with perfect foresight, lifetime
income taxation leads to unambiguous welfare gains as it redistributes resources from high-
consumption to low-consumption households. A similar argument does not hold for the case
with idiosyncratic risk. In a lifecycle model calibrated to the US economy, a transition to a tax
on lifetime income leads to small welfare losses as workers increase their savings early in life in
order to insure against uncertain future tax liabilities.
In the third chapter, we study the question how risk taking by banks responds to an exogenous
change in leverage. We employ heterogeneity in the geographic distribution of banks’ offices in
order to introduce an exogenous variation in deposit supply based on local economic shocks.
This variation is used to instrument banks’ leverage. We measure bank risk taking by directly
observing lending decisions on all residential mortgages in the US. In response to an exogenous
decrease in their leverage, banks become more responsive to risk characteristics of residential
mortgage loans, and the median predicted probability of default for issued loans decreases.
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Chapter 1
Effective Marginal Tax Rates of
Pension Systems
1.1 Introduction
For economists, marginal tax rates are central to understanding labor supply. A large part
of the optimal tax literature is concerned with managing the trade-off between insurance and
distortions to labor supply through high marginal tax rates. Following Prescott (2004), there is
also a sizable literature that uses marginal tax rates in order to understand differences in labor
supply patterns across countries.
However, measuring marginal tax rates properly is a more complicated problem than it ap-
pears at first glance. The reason for this is that taxes do not simply ”vanish into the ether”, but
rather are used to finance expenditures, some of which are linked to current or past incomes.
This implies, for example, a significantly higher effective marginal tax rate at the bottom of the
income distribution due to benefit withdrawal, than what would be suggested by considering
5
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only the statutory tax rates.
Another area where the statutory rate is likely to be a poor estimate of the true distortion
are social security contributions, especially pension taxes, as future benefits are often linked to
past contributions, potentially significantly reducing the distortions below the statutory rate. To
see this, consider two extreme examples. Both country A and B have a public pension system
that levies a 10% payroll tax on earnings to fund this system. In country A, pensions are paid
as a lump-sum transfer to all pensioners, while in country B, pensioners receive a pension that
is equal to their contributions plus interest at the market rate. Thus, workers in country A see
the statutory rate as a full tax, as their income is taxed at a 10% marginal rate, while pension
benefits depend on aggregate labour supply, but do not increase with labour supply. On the
other hand, workers in country B do not perceive their pension contributions as a tax at all, as
the marginal tax they face is perfectly offset by the marginal increase in pension benefits. This,
admittedly oversimplified, example demonstrates the importance of viewing the pension system
as a whole when considering its impact on labor supply decisions.
In 2017, the OECD estimated that social security contributions, most of which are earmarked
for the pension system, constitute 33% of the labour wedge for a US worker with average wages,
and 42% for workers making less than 90% of the average wage1. Due to the looming solvency
crisis of many pension systems, this fraction is likely to go up in the absence of fundamental
reforms. Thus it is of primary importance to understand the specific distortions induced by the
pension system and what steps might be taken to reduce them.
This paper demonstrates that the effective marginal tax rates of the US pension system can
be directly derived from households’ optimality conditions in a stochastic lifecycle model with
ex-ante heterogeneity and idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, I show that the effective tax rate can
be decomposed into five intuitive components, that relate to i) inter-generational redistribution,
1OECD (2018), accessed at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00799-en
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ii) intra-generational redistribution, iii) demographic conditions, iv) borrowing constraints, and
v) the insurance provided through the pension system. This model is then calibrated to the
US economy in order to quantify these net distortions, as well as their decomposition. Over
the course of workers’ lives, the effective marginal tax rate drops from an average of 8% at age
21 to −1% at age 63, the average effective rate over the lifecycle being significantly lower than
the payroll tax of 11%, at 4%. Despite the very progressive US pension system, which sees
replacement rates as high as 90% and as low as 15%, there is very little variation of effective
tax rates by income, with the difference between average rates faced by high- and low-income
workers staying below 2% points for most of their working lives. Furthermore, this variation is
exactly opposite in sign to what one might first expect, with low income workers subject to the
largest effective tax rates. Additionally, this relative homogeneity hides significant heterogeneity
between income groups that can be uncovered by means of decomposing the effective tax rate
into its components. While for low-income workers, borrowing constraints play a sizable role,
high-income workers are subject to much higher intra-generational redistribution.
The decomposition of the effective tax rates also allows me to appraise the effects of the
inherent progressivity of the pension system on labour supply in more detail. I show that
this mainly impacts two of the components of the labour distortion: the intra-generational
redistribution, and the insurance component. I demonstrate that the latter is quantitatively
small for all agents, while the former is sizable on average. This is due to the fact that workers
pay for the average replacement rate through the payroll tax, but take into account their expected
marginal replacement rate when making labour supply decisions. Due to the strong progressivity
of the current US system, the average marginal replacement rate lies significantly below the
average replacement rate, thereby driving up the average effective tax rates.
Motivated by this finding, I consider a reform that replaces the current pension system with a
linear pension system that provides the same average replacement rate. I find that such a reform
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would reduce the average effective marginal tax rate of the US pension system by 3% points,
leading to a 1% increase in effective labour supply in the economy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief overview
of the related literature. In section 1.3, I demonstrate how the effective marginal tax rate can be
derived from the household optimization problem in a standard lifecycle model with a realistic
pension system, while section 1.4 demonstrates how the effective tax rate can be decomposed.
Section 1.5 calibrates this model and discusses the current effective marginal tax rate of the US
pension system quantitatively, while section 1.6 is concerned with the policy experiment. Finally,
section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper is not the first to consider the question of the net marginal tax rate associated with
the social security payroll tax. Especially in the literature on the privatization of social security,
authors have long cited the distortions introduced by the payroll tax as one of the ways in
which a privatized system may be superior. Significant contributions to this discussion include
Homburg (1990), Breyer and Straub (1993), as well as Feldstein and Samwick (1998). The first
two consider social security in a simple two-period OLG economy, while the latter takes into
account a more realistic lifecycle. What is common to this literature is the effective tax rate has
been approximated very roughly by the differences in returns between private savings and the
public pension system. While I show that this difference does indeed impact the effective tax
rate of the pension system, it is not the quantitatively most important component.
Following work by Gordon (1982), Browning (1985), and Burkhauser and Turner (1985),
Feldstein and Samwick (1992) were among the first to consider the net effective tax rate of so-
cial security by taking into account the specific design of the pension system. Similar to this
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study, they find that effective tax rates are decreasing over the lifecycle. However, they employ
several simplifying assumptions, chiefly the absence of idiosyncratic risk as well as abstracting
from borrowing constraints. This implies that their model-free approximation of the labor dis-
tortion significantly overstates the progressivity of the net marginal tax rate significantly. In an
update to the original study, Cushing (2005) quantifies the spread between effective tax rates
on high- and low-income earners to be 19%-points, which reduces to less than 3%-points when
including uncertainty and borrowing constraints. Additionally, while certain reform proposals
are discussed, none of the above papers carry out any sort of policy experiments based on their
findings.
There are several other model-free approximations to the effective tax rate, all of which make
assumptions in order to avoid dealing with uncertainty faced by workers. Goda et al. (2007) and
Goda et al. (2011) assume that agents behave as if their current earnings are the last earnings
in their lives when forming expectations on future benefits. This leads to effective tax rates
that are increasing over this lifecycle due to the progressive design of the US pension system.
When, instead, explicitly considering workers’ expectations about their future labour supply, the
net distortions are decreasing over the lifecycle. In another recent study on the impact of taxes
and welfare benefits on labor supply in the UK, Brewer and Shaw (2018) abstract from any
inter-temporal considerations (including pension entitlements) altogether.
Finally, there is a sizable quantitative literature on pension reform in OLG lifecycle models.
Some of these, including Bagchi (2015), Huggett and Ventura (1999), Huggett and Parra (2010),
and Brendler (2016) have included the effect of future pension benefits on labor supply. However,
all of these treat the labor supply decision as a ”black box”, without discussing the effects of
modeling decisions on effective labor distortions. As I demonstrate, assumptions on the risk
faced by workers, as well as on their ability to borrow can have significant impact on the effective
marginal tax rates induced by the pension system, which is in turn likely to influence any verdict
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on its desirability as an instrument of social insurance.
To summarize, this paper’s contributions are three-fold. First, it is the first study to demon-
strate that the net effective tax rates induced by the pension system can be formally derived
from workers’ optimality conditions in a lifecycle model with idiosyncratic risk. Second, it quan-
tifies these net distortions in a realistic, calibrated model that allows judgment on the relative
importance of influencing factors and modeling decisions. Finally, to my knowledge it is the first
to implement a policy experiment aimed at reducing the effective tax rate of the pension system.
1.3 Deriving Net Effective Tax Rates
1.3.1 Institutional Framework
In the United States, pensions are administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA).
Workers and firms contribute to the budget of the Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) through a linear payroll tax on all earnings below a certain cap. In 2015, the total
statutory rate was set at 6.2% for employers and workers each, coming to a total of 12.4%2, while
the cap on taxable earnings was set at 118, 500$ (SSA (2017)). When workers retire, the SSA
calculates their Average Indexed Monthly Income (AIME), by taking the indexed average 420
highest earning months (corresponding to 35 years). Indexing is done with the national average
wage index in order to ensure that worker’s contributions are not eaten up by inflation and that
they profit from productivity growth during their working life. Based on the calculated AIME,
the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is calculated by applying a highly progressive pension
formula. In 2105, the PIA was calculated as 90% of the first 826$ of AIME, plus 32% of the
AIME between this first bend-point, and 4, 154$, plus 15% of AIME above this second bend-point
up to the cap of monthly taxable earnings at 9, 875$. Above this cap, the marginal replacement
2Of these, 10.4% are earmarked for the old age pension
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Figure 1.1: Average and Marginal Replacement Rate
Note: All information from the 2016 statistical supplement of the SSA (SSA (2017))
rate drops to zero. Figure 1.1 plots the average and marginal replacement rates as a function of
AIME according to the 2015 SSA rules.
Since the 1977 Social Security Amendments, the marginal replacement rates of 90%, 32%, and
15% have stayed constant, while the two bend-points and the cap on taxable earnings has been
indexed to the national average wage.
1.3.2 The Net Effective Tax Rate in an OLG Model
A key reason why economists care about the net effective rate in the first place is that it is
this rate, rather than the statutory rate that measures the distortions of workers’ labor supply
decisions. However, instead of trying to approximate the distortions by calculating the net
tax rates under simplifying assumptions, it is possible - and arguably simpler - to derive the
distortions directly from a realistic model. By taking this approach, we automatically take into
account the effects of uncertainty and borrowing constraints.
It is a standard result that the marginal distortion to any decision can be measured by a
wedge. This wedge is defined as measuring the difference between an agents marginal rate of
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substitution (MRS) and their marginal rate of transformation (MRT). Formally, the wedge τ is
defined as
τ = 1− MRS
MRT
.
If a decision is undistorted, then an agent’s marginal rates of substitution and transformation
will be equalized and the wedge τ will be equal to zero. In case the decision is distorted, however,
the two marginal rates will be different, leading to a non-zero wedge3.
In the case of the labour wedges that this paper is concerned with, the relevant margin is
that of exchanging leisure time for income through labor supply. Thus, the marginal rate of
transformation is simply given by the gross wage that workers can earn in the market, given
their productivity. On the other hand, their marginal rate of substitution is given by
MRS =
ul
uc
,
where ui, i = l, c denotes the marginal utility of leisure and consumption, respectively. These
two marginal utilities will be determined as part of workers’ optimizing behavior, which is what
I will use in order to derive a formulation for the net effective tax rate.
Thus, instead of trying to approximate the effective tax rate in the spirit of most of the
literature, this paper will take the approach of solving for an allocation induced by the pension
system and then using this allocation to derive the labour wedges, which equal the effective
marginal tax rate. This approach is similar in spirit to the approach taken by the New Dynamic
Public Finance literature (see for example Farhi and Werning (2013) and Golosov et al. (2016))
that solve for the constrained optimal allocation and use this to characterize optimal labour
distortions.
3Note that this concept is general enough to also capture the effect of a subsidy which will lead to a negative
wedge.
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I consider a T period OLG economy with constant population growth, ex-ante heterogeneity,
idiosyncratic productivity risk, and longevity risk. Workers enter the economy at age t = 1,
work until t = R − 1, and then retire in period R until they die and exit the economy. They
face mortality risk, and have an age specific survival probability ψt of surviving up until age
t, conditional on having survived until age t − 1, and die for sure at age T + 1. During their
working lives, they supply labor to the market, for which they are compensated at a rate θ,
where θ denotes a worker’s idiosyncratic productivity. At the start of their lives, each worker
observes their ex-ante type θ1, and then draws an idiosyncratic productivity shock θt, t ≥ 2 from
a distribution F (θt|θt−1) in each period of their working life.
In each period of their working life, agents observe their current productivity, and make a
labor-leisure, as well as a consumption-savings decision. Markets are incomplete, and workers
only have access to a risk-less bond which pays an interest rate r. Upon entering retirement,
agents cease to supply labor, instead only making a consumption-savings decision until they die
and exit the economy. I abstract from any bequest motives, instead the government confiscates
all estates and uses them to fund government consumption.
During their working life, agents are subject to a payroll tax τ on earnings up to the taxable
maximum yˆ, an income tax T(y) on labor income, as well as a flat tax τa on capital income.
During retirement, agents receive a pension payment B(y¯R), which depends on their indexed
average earnings up to retirement. Pension contributions are indexed at a rate i. It should be
noted, that I make one important simplifying assumption with regards to indexing. Specifically,
I assume that the returns to pension contributions come from outside of the model instead of
from wage growth. While it is possible to derive an implicit return to contributions within the
model by including wage growth, this will lead to issues when solving the model, as the standard
methods for re-introducing stationarity into a model with wage growth rely on the absence of
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income effects to the labour supply decision (see for example Fehr and Kindermann (2018)),
which cannot be achieved in a setting with a general pension system. The pension schedule B
follows the current US schedule presented in the preceding section4
Formally, workers solve the following problem upon observing their productivity draw
Vt (a, y¯, θ) = max
c,a′,y
u
(
c,
y
θ
)
+ ψt+1βEt [Vt+1 (a′, y¯′, θ′)] , (1.1)
subject to the budget constraint
c+ a′ ≤ y − T(y)−min(y, yˆ)τ + (1 + (1− τa) r) a, t < R (1.2)
c+ a′ ≤ B(y¯) + (1 + (1− τa)r)a, t ≥ R (1.3)
as well as a0 = 0, a
′ ≥ 0 and the law of motion for the past average earnings y¯
y¯t+1 =

(1 + i) (t−1)y¯t+min(y,yˆ)t , t < R
y¯t, t ≥ R.
Here, B(·) denotes the pension schedule as a function of past average earnings.
We can see directly from this formulation of the agents’ problem that the impact of the
pension system on labour supply will be two-fold. On the one hand, there is a marginal tax τ
that is paid on all income below the cap, which will cause a decrease in labor supply. On the
other hand, agents realize that working more now will increase their average earnings and hence
lead to higher benefits during retirement.
The first order conditions of an optimizing household lead to the following inter- and intra-
4This formulation represents a good approximation of the current US pension system. The main difference is
that in the US system, not all years of earnings count towards the calculation of the AIME, but rather the 35
years with highest earnings.
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temporal optimality conditions
uc(·) = βψt+1 (1 + (1− τa) r)Etuc(c′, l′) + µ (1.4)
ul(·)1
θ
+ uc(·) [1− T′(y)− 1y<yˆτ ] + βψt+1Et ∂Vt+1(·)
∂y¯′
∂y¯′
∂y
= 0. (1.5)
While the inter-temporal Euler Equation is not directly affected by the pension system, the
intra-temporal condition now contains an extra term, compared to the case without considering
the impact of labour supply on future benefits. Specifically, we will have an additional envelope
condition that captures the effect of entering the next period with an additional unit of past
average income.
We can use the fact that average income does not enter the agents’ budget constraint until
the retirement period in order to ’roll forward’ the envelope condition until period R to write5
∂Vt+1
∂y¯′
=
t
R− 1(1 + i)
R−t−1βR−t−1
R−t−1∏
q=1
ψt+qEt
B′(y¯R) T∑
s˜=R
βs˜−R
s˜−R∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜uc(cs˜)
 . (1.6)
Hence, the envelope condition for average income is given by the discounted marginal val-
uation of benefit payments throughout retirement. Substituting this into the intra-temporal
optimality condition, and then in turn substituting this condition into our definition of the
effective tax rate
τ twedge = 1−
MRT
MRS
,
yields the following result:
Proposition 1 The effective marginal tax rate of the pension system at age t is given by
τ
t
wedge = 1yt<yˆ
τ − 1
R− 1β
R−t
(1 + i)
R−t
T∑
s¯=R
β
s¯−R
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+qEt
[
B′(y¯R)
uc(cs˜)
uc (ct, lt)
] .
5A detailed proof is given in the appendix
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Thus, the effective marginal tax rate of the pension system has a formulation made up of two
parts. The first term describes the instantaneous marginal tax due on any earnings below the
cap. The second term, while somewhat unwieldy, denotes the discounted marginal benefits that
are due to an extra unit of income in period t. Here, it is important to note that the correct
discount factor is the stochastic discount factor, as workers weigh the marginal benefit streams
during retirement with their associated marginal utilities of consumption.
In order to gain a better understanding of the above formula, it is helpful to come back to
the leading example of this paper, namely the comparison of two countries, one of which pays
pensions as a lump-sum benefit while the other pays pensions as contributions plus interest at
the market rate. The case of the first country is simple, as we simply need to set B′(·) = 0
in order to see that any household with income below the cap on taxable earnings will see the
payroll tax τ as a full tax. The case for the second country is easier to understand if we make
some additional assumptions. Specifically, I assume that the lifecycle lasts only for two periods,
there is no population growth or mortality risk, and that workers do not face any borrowing
constraints. Given these assumptions, the above formula simplifies to
τ twedge = 1yt<yˆ [τ − β(1 + i)B′(y¯2)] ,
since we can use the Euler equation to substitute in E
[
uc(c2)
uc(c1,l1)
]
= 1. Finally, since benefits are
paid in a one-to-one relationship to contributions, we have that B′ = τ , and since the pension
system is indexed at the market rate, we will have
τ twedge = 1yt<yˆ [τ − β(1 + r)τ ] = 0,
leading to the anticipated ’zero marginal tax’ result.
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Clearly, all the above-mentioned simplifying assumptions are unlikely to hold in any realistic
model of the lifecycle. Hence, I will devote the following section to decomposing the effective
marginal tax rate of the pension system into its components in order to determine the factors
influencing it. I will show that the effective marginal tax rate can be separated into five dif-
ferent components: i) inter-generational redistribution, ii) intra-generational redistribution, iii)
a demographic component, iv) borrowing constraints, and v) the insurance value of non-linear
pensions.
1.4 Decomposing Effective Tax Rates
It is instructive to start this discussion by considering a simplified version of the above model.
To this end, consider an economy in which the lifecycle consists of two periods. During the first
period agents work, and during the second they are retired and only consume. Agents discount
the future at rate β and can save using a risk-free bond with interest rate r = 1β − 1. For
notational simplicity, I abstract from longevity risk at this stage. Also, I assume that the payroll
tax is applied to all earnings6. The population in this economy grows at a constant rate, with
each generation being 1 + g times the size of the previous one.
In this simplified two-period economy, the effective marginal tax rate is given by
τwedge = τ − β(1 + i) uc(c2)
uc(c1, l1)
B′(y1),
as in this case, first period earnings capture the entire history of earnings.
It should be noted that the remainder of this paper will employ a different view on the
effective marginal tax rate of the pension system compared to the preceding section. Specifically,
6Both of these simplifying assumptions will be dropped when discussing the final result of the section
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until now, we have compared the contemporaneous payroll tax τ with marginal benefits paid in
the future. In order to better understand the effective tax rates, it is helpful to dispense with
this ’dual view’, instead expressing the effective marginal tax in terms of replacement rates, only.
Specifically, I will use the budget balance of the pension system in order to replace the payroll
tax with an expression in terms of the average replacement rate of the pension system.
Using this, we can relate the payroll tax and the pension benefits in the following manner7
(1 + g)
∫
θ1
τy1dF (θ1) =
∫
θ1
B(y1)dF (θ1),
which immediately implies
τ =
1
1 + g
Y¯
B¯
=
b
1 + g
,
where b denotes the average replacement rate.
Thus, workers do not need to pay a payroll tax equal to the average replacement rate since
the population is growing over time. This is exactly the effect captured by the third of our effects,
the demographic component. The higher the population growth, the lower the payroll tax rate
will have to be in order to finance a given level of benefits.
The first component of the effective tax rate, inter-generational redistribution, is driven by
the fact that workers use two separate vehicles to save for retirement in this model. One of the
vehicles, the pension system, pays a return of i, while the risk free bond that agents could use
instead has a return of r > i. The larger this gap in returns, the larger the effective tax rate will
be, as agents would have been better off by investing in the private asset instead. This can be
interpreted as a form of redistribution between generations insofar as the lack of a market return
is caused by the system not being pre-funded, implying that all generations are contributing
7Note that it is at this point that the assumption that resources for indexing of pension contributions come
from outside of the model takes hold, as the right hand side of the equation contains the un-indexed earnings
history rather than the indexed history.
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to the windfall gain realized by the initial generation of pensioners, who were able to enjoy a
pension without ever contributing to the system.
The second component of the effective tax, namely intra-generational redistribution is deter-
mined by the relationship between the worker’s individual marginal replacement rate B′, and
the average replacement rate b in the economy. If a worker faces an individual replacement rate
of exactly b, for example because the pension system is flat-rate, this component will be equal
to zero, as she is not subject to any redistribution within her generation. If she has a replace-
ment rate above b, this component will be negative, hence lowering the effective tax rate (and
increasing it, respectively, for an individual replacement rate below b).
The fourth component of the tax, the effect of borrowing constraints represents the fact that
pensions are only substitutes for savings in situations where workers would have chosen to save
the same amount in the absence of the pension system. A worker who is heavily borrowing
constrained will not view pension contributions as savings, but rather as a tax, since she would
prefer to consume the income today. Obviously, this component will be zero for all workers who
are not borrowing constrained.
The fifth and final component, the insurance value of the pension system will be zero for all
workers in the simple two-period model, as there is no uncertainty left at the time when agents
make their choices. This component will be discussed when we extend the model to three or
more periods.
In order to separate out each of the four terms, we can substitute the budget balance condi-
tion into the above formula for the effective marginal tax rate, and collect terms.8 Denoting
the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint by µ, it is simple to transform the above
formula for the effective tax rate in order to get the following result:
8Full proofs of all results in this section can be found in the appendix
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Proposition 2 In a two-period OLG economy with ex-ante heterogeneity and constant popu-
lation growth g, the effective marginal tax rate of a PAYGO pension system can be additively
separated into four components as
τwedge =
r − i
1 + r
[
B′
u′(c2)
u′(c1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
inter-generational
redistribution
+ [b− B′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
intra-generational
redistribution
− b g
1 + g︸ ︷︷ ︸
demographic
component
+ B′
µ1
uc(c1, l1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
borrowing constraint
.
Considering the inter-generational redistribution component of the effective tax, we can see
that another way to describe this would be as an opportunity cost of the pension system, as
agents could have realized the same marginal benefit by investing in the private security at a
higher rate. The larger the difference in rates r − i, the larger this component will be.
The intra-generational redistribution component is straightforward, as it is only driven by
the difference (in multiple periods, the expected difference) between the private marginal and
the average replacement rate in the economy. Here, it is important to note that the average of
this component across the population will not necessarily be zero. This is due to the fact that
we are comparing a marginal to an average rate. While workers will have to pay for the average
rate through their contributions, they will only receive benefits on their last dollar earned at the
marginal rate. If the system is highly progressive, as in the US, the average replacement rate
will be above the marginal replacement rate for a large portion of the population, leading to a
positive intra-generational redistribution component on average.
The demographic component is, in effect, a discount enjoyed by all contributors to the pension
system that makes it more affordable to finance an average replacement rate of b, the higher the
population growth is.
Finally, borrowing constraints increase the effective marginal tax due to the fact that a manda-
tory pension system may force some workers onto a suboptimal asset accumulation path, which
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will ’eat up’ a fraction µ1uc(c1,l1) of their private marginal benefit B
′, since a borrowing constrained
worker would have chosen lower savings and more current consumption if given the opportunity.
After the decomposition of the effective tax rate in a two period model, I will now turn to
a three-period model with two working periods. As previously stated, the three-period model
will introduce the insurance effect to the effective tax rate, arising from the fact that workers
may value the insurance across lifetime income histories afforded by a progressive pension sys-
tem. This effect does not appear in the model with only one working period, as in this case the
current income fully characterises the history of lifetime income.
In a three-period OLG model, the effective marginal tax rates will be changing with age and
are given by
τ1wedge = τ − β2(1 + i)2
∫
θ2
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
1
2
B′(y¯)dFθ2
τ2wedge = τ − β(1 + i)
uc(c3)
uc(c2, l2)
1
2
B′(y¯)
Once again, we can use budget balance to express the payroll tax in terms of the average
replacement rate b, as
τ = b
Y¯
(1 + g)2
∫
θ1
y1dF (θ1) + (1 + g)
∫
θ2
y2dF (θ2)
= b
Y¯∑
Y
,
with Y¯ = 12
∫
θ1
y1dF (θ1) +
1
2
∫
θ2
y2dF (θ2) being average lifetime earnings of a pensioner, and∑
Y being aggregate earnings in the economy at the time of pension entry. Note that we can
no longer replace this fraction with a simple function of g, as average income may differ between
age groups. The principle, however, stays the same with g > 0 implying that Y¯∑Y < 12 9.
9Recall that there are now two generations contributing to the pension payments of the current old instead of
just one
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Once more, we substitute the budget balance condition into the above formulas for the effec-
tive tax rate, and employ the same technique as in the previous proposition.
Proposition 3 In a three period OLG economy with constant population growth, ex-ante het-
erogeneity, and idiosyncratic risk, the effective marginal tax of a PAYGO pension system can be
additively separated into five components as
τ1wedge =
1
2
[
(1 + r)2 − (1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
E
[
u′(c3)
u′(c1)
B′
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
inter-generational
redistribution
+ E [b− B′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
intra-generational
redistribution
− b
∑
1
2Y − Y¯∑
1
2Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
demographic
component
+
E [µ1 + µ2]
uc(c1, l1)
E [B′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
borrowing constraint
−Cov
(
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
,B′(y¯)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
insurance value
]
τ2wedge =
1
2
[
r − i
1 + r
[
B′
(
1− µ2
uc(c2, l2)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
inter-generational
redistribution
+ [b− B′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
intra-generational
redistribution
− b
∑
1
2Y − Y¯∑
1
2Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
demographic
component
+ B′
µ2
uc(c2, l2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
borrowing constraint
]
.
The most notable difference to the two period model is the introduction of the insurance value
of the pension system. If the replacement rate is negatively correlated with consumption in the
pension period (i.e. pensioners are receiving more marginal income in states of the world where
they value it more), this will lead to an additional insurance value of the pension on top of the
expected marginal replacement rate B′. This effect only materializes if there is still uncertainty
left to be resolved at the time that the labour supply decision is taken. This is why the effect is
present in the first period (when the productivity draw of the second period is still uncertain),
but not in the second period, when agents know their entire history upon making their labour
supply decisions.
A second point of note relates to borrowing constraints. Here, it is important to recognise that
not only current borrowing constraints matter, but also workers’ expectations of being borrowing
constrained in the future. This will be particularly important in the general model with multiple
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retirement periods and mortality risk, as it relates to an additional restriction of pensions not
discussed previously. Since pensions are paid out as an annuity, agents cannot borrow against
them during retirement. As, however, conditional survival probabilities drop sharply towards
the end of agents’ lives, it seems likely that they would choose to front-load consumption if given
the chance. Since pensions do not provide this flexibility, there will be an effect of borrowing
constraints even after all uncertainty with regards to lifetime income has been resolved.
Finally, we also need to take into account that there are now two generations financing benefit
payments, implying that each worker will only have to pay half as much to finance the same level
of benefits. Thus, in a more general model, the term pre-multiplying the respective effective tax
rates will be driven by the ratio of working to retired agents. This has an immediate implication
for the policy debate over retirement ages, as increasing the retirement age will decrease the ratio
and hence decrease the average effective marginal tax of the pension system (keeping benefits
constant).
The three period model captures all salient features of the full model, without burying any
insights into the driving forces of effective tax rates below overly complicated notation. How-
ever, in order to later conduct a meaningful quantitative analysis of existing pension systems, a
similar result for the full model is needed.
The underlying economy changes with regard to the three period model in two ways, both
of which will lead to some notational changes which I will point out below. First we need to
dispense with the assumption that pensioners are retired for only one period, as this clearly
is not the case in reality. Second, any realistic lifecycle model will have to take into account
longevity risk. Specifically, I return to the full model introduced in section 1.3, in which workers
face ex-ante heterogeneity, idiosyncratic productivity risk, and longevity risk.
Proposition 4 In the general model, the effective marginal tax rate of the pension system in
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period t can be additively decomposed into five components as
τ twedge =
1y≤yˆ
R− 1
[
inter-generational redistribution + intra-generational redistribution−
demographic component + borrowing constraints− insurance value
]
,
with
inter-generational redistribution =
T∑
s¯=R
([
(1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−t − (1 + i)R−t
]
βs¯−tΠs¯−tq=1ψt+q
)
E
[
u′(cs¯)
u′(ct)
B
′(yR)
]
intra-generational redistribution =
T∑
s¯=R
E
[
b−B′ (yR)]
demographic component =
T∑
s¯=R
(
1− (1 + g)−(s¯−R)Πs¯−Rq˜=1 ψR+q˜
∑
Y˜∑
Y
)
b
borrowing constraints =
T∑
s¯=R
E
[
B
′ (yR)]E[u′(ct)− (1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−tβs¯−tΠs¯−tq=1ψt+qu′(cs¯)
u′(ct)
]
insurance value =
T∑
s¯=R
(1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−tβs¯−tΠs¯−tq=1ψt+qCov
(
u′(cs¯)
u′(ct)
,B′
(
yR
))
.
All of these terms are straightforward generalizations of their counterparts in the three period
model, with notational differences arising from the introduction of multiple pension periods as
well as mortality risk.
An important reason given for the presence of public pension systems is the presence of longevity
risk, as it protects workers from out-living their savings. If workers value this insurance, we would
expect it to be reflected in the marginal valuation of pension benefits and hence in the effective
marginal tax rate. This expectation, it turns out, is met, as the effect of this insurance against
longevity is, in fact, captured by the demographic component. While, at first, somewhat counter-
intuitive, this makes sense when we consider that the advantage of annuities over private savings
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in insuring against longevity comes from the fact that, in the absence of annuities, workers would
have to accumulate sufficient assets to cover the maximum possible lifespan. When annuities, or
public pensions, are available however, workers only need to accumulate sufficient assets to cover
their expected lifespan, as there is no aggregate longevity risk. Thus, the shorter the expected
lifespan after entering retirement is (holding the maximum possible lifespan constant), the higher
the demographic component will be, in turn leading to a lower effective tax rate.
Following this detailed theoretical analysis of the effective tax rate and its components, the
next section will deal with their quantitative analysis. To this end, I will build a lifecycle model
which will be calibrated to the US economy. Of specific interest in this section is the question
how much the progressive nature of the pension system is reflected in the progressivity of the
effective tax rate. Additionally, I will devote some time to discussing the relative sizes of the dif-
ferent components of the effective tax rate, as this will give some insight into how the distortions
induced by a pension system may be reduced.
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
1.5.1 Setup
In order to analyze the quantitative importance of the pension wedges, I build a partial equilib-
rium OLG model with uncertain lifetime, ex-ante heterogeneity, idiosyncratic risk, endogenous
labour supply, and a consumption savings decision.
Each period, a new cohort is born, whose size is 1 +n times that of the previous cohort, with
the population growth rate n being constant over time. Agents in my model live for a maximum
of T periods. During their lives, they work for the first R− 1 periods, and then retire at age R,
from which time on they draw a pension and only consume. They face mortality risk throughout
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their lives - with the age specific survival probability ψt+1 of surviving from age t to t+1. At age
T +1 agents die for sure and exit the economy. During their life, agents can accumulate assets at
an exogenous interest rate r, both to insure against idiosyncratic shocks to labour productivity
and to save for retirement. I assume that they do not have any bequest motive.
Given that the demographic characteristics of the economy are stable over time, there will
always be a fraction µt of age t individuals. Given the population growth rate n and the survival
probabilities ψ, we can relate the relative sizes of cohorts as
µt+1 =
ψt+1
1 + n
µt.
For simplicity, I normalize these relative weights such that
∑T
t=1 µt = 1.
1.5.2 The Government
The government employs three different instruments. First, there is a capital gains tax τa.
Second, there is a non-linear income tax T(y) on labour income. These two taxes, together
with the confiscation of accidental bequests are employed to fund some exogenous, and wasteful
government spending G. Finally, the government runs a balanced social security system.
I model the social security system to be as close as possible to the current US system.
Specifically, the government collects a payroll tax τssc on all earnings below the social security
cap yˆ. Contrary to the current US system, I model this tax as being exclusively levied on workers,
instead of being shared between workers and firms as I am operating in partial equilibrium.
During retirement, agents receive a pension as a function B of their average income y¯. It is
important to note that, in keeping with the current US system, only income up to the cap y¯
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counts toward calculating y¯, i.e. that
y¯t =
1
min(t, R− 1)
min(t,R−1)∑
s=1
(1 + i)min(t,R−1)−smin(ys, yˆ),
where i is the indexing applied to workers pension contributions. The function B is identical to
the one currently used in the US. Writing the average income in the economy as yˆ, we have
Bt(y¯) =

0.9 · y¯, y¯ ≤ 0.2 · yˆ
0.9 · 0.2 · yˆ + 0.32 · (y¯ − 0.2 · yˆ), 0.2 · yˆ < y¯ ≤ 1.25 · yˆ
0.9 · 0.2 · yˆ + 0.32 · (1.25− 0.2) · yˆ + 0.15 · (y¯ − 1.25 · yˆ), 1.25 · yˆ < y¯ ≤ 2.5 · yˆ
0.9 · 0.2 · yˆ + 0.32 · (1.25− 0.2) · yˆ + 0.15 · (2.5− 1.25) · yˆ, 2.5 · yˆ < y¯
for t ≥ R, and Bt(y¯) = 0 otherwise.
1.5.3 Households
Upon being born, agents draw an initial productivity type θ1 from the distribution F (θ1). For
t > 1, productivity follows a Markov process with conditional distribution Ft (θt|θt−1). Thus,
there is both ex-ante heterogeneity between households as well as idiosyncratic risk.
During their working lives, agents are faced with wages ωt = γtθt, where γ describes the
common life-cycle component to productivity, while θ is the agent’s idiosyncratic productivity.
In retirement, the life-cycle productivity component drops to zero for all agents immediately
implying an exit from the labour force. Upon observing her productivity, the agent makes a
labour-leisure and a consumption-saving decision, taking the government’s policy into account.
They do so in order to maximize their expected discounted sum of utilities, with the flow utility
in each period being given by
Ut =
c1−σt
1− σ + ξ
(1− lt)1−ν
1− ν ,
where ct denotes current consumption, lt denotes the fraction of time devoted to the labour
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market, and ξ is the relative weight of consumption versus leisure in the utility function that is
common to all agents.
As agents take the government’s policies into account when making labour supply decisions,
their information set needs to include a statistic used to form expectations on their marginal
replacement rate in retirement. In order to be able to write the household problem recursively,
I use the simple form of y¯ to write a law of motion for it as
y¯t+1 =

(1 + i) (t−1)∗y¯t+min(yt,y¯)t , 1 < t ≤ R− 1
y¯t, t > R− 1
and y¯1 = 0. Thus, the state y¯ describes an agent’s current average past income that was subject
to the social security payroll tax.
Denoting the value of an agent at age t by Vt(a, y¯, θ), where a is their current asset holdings,
y¯ their past average income and θ their current idiosyncratic shock to productivity, we can write
the household problem recursively as
Vt(a, y¯, θ) = max
c,a′,l
c1−σ
1− σ + ξ
(1− l)1−ν
1− ν + βψt+1
∫
θ′
Vt(a
′, y¯′, θ′)dF (θ′|θ) (1.7)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ γtθl − T(γtθl)−min(γtθl, y¯)τssc + Bt(y¯) + (1 + (1− τa)r)a
y¯t+1 =

(1 + i) (t−1)∗y¯t+min(yt,y¯)t , t ≤ R− 1
y¯t, t > R− 1
as well as a0 = y¯0 = 0, and the borrowing constraint a
′ ≥ 0.
The result of the household’s maximization problem will be two age-specific policy functions
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a′(a, y¯, θ, t) and l(a, y¯, θ, t).
1.5.4 Equilibrium Definition
A partial equilibrium in the OLG economy is defined as two policy functions a′(a, y¯, θ, t) and
l(a, y¯, θ, t), together with a tax schedule T, a payroll tax τssc, and a distribution Λ(a, y¯, θ, t) such
that, given the benefit schedule B and the interest rate r
1. The policy functions a′(a, y¯, θ, t) and l(a, y¯, θ, t) solve the households maximization problem
(1.7)
2. The government runs a balanced budget, i.e.
R−1∑
t=1
µt
∫
T(γtθl(a, y¯, θ, t))dΛ(a, y¯, θ, t) +
T∑
t=1
µt−1ψt
∫
rτaa
′(a, y¯, θ, t− 1)dΛ(a, y¯, θ, t− 1)
+
T∑
t=1
µt−1(1− ψt)
∫
a′(a, y¯, θ, t− 1)dΛ(a, y¯, θ, t) ≥ G
3. The social security system runs a balanced budget, i.e.
R−1∑
t=1
µt
∫
min(γtθl(a, y¯, θ, t), y¯)τsscdΛ(a, y¯, θ, t) ≥
T∑
t=R
µt
∫
B(y¯)dΛ(a, y¯, θ, t)
4. The distribution Λ(a, y¯, θ, t) is consistent with individual choice, i.e.
Λ(a˜, ˜¯y, θ′, t+ 1) =
∫
Xt
f(θ′|θ)dΛ(a, y¯, θ, t),
where Xt = {(a, y¯, θ) s.t. a′(a, y¯, θ, t) = a˜ ∧ y¯′(l(a, y¯, θ, t)) = ˜¯y}, as well as with the initial
conditions a0 = y¯1 = 0.
1.5.5 Parameterization of the Model
I parameterize the model to reflect key aspects of the US economy.
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Demographics: Agents enter the economy at age 21, and die for sure at age 101. I set the
annual population growth rate n to 1.04%, which coincides with the US population growth rate
since the 1960′s. The age specific survival probabilities are taken from the 2009 US life tables
for males from Arias (2009). One period in my model corresponds to two years.
Taxation: I set the tax rate on capital income to τa = 0.2 following Nardi et al. (2016). The
level of government spending is taken from Huggett and Ventura (1999) and set at 19.5% of
average income. In order to include the insurance effect of taxation into my model, I choose a
non-linear income tax function T(y) = y − λy1−τ , which is frequently used in the literature and
has been shown to approximate the current US tax system relatively well. I follow Heathcote
et al. (2014) in setting τ = 0.151 and calibrate λ to balance the governments budget. Indexing
of workers’ wages is done at an annual rate of 0.6%, which is consistent with the average real
indexing of social security contributions since 197510. Finally, the social security payroll tax is
determined inside the model to balance the social security budget.
Productivity : For the age productivity profile, I take the age profile of earnings for US males,
with the numerical values taken from Fehr and Kindermann (2018). For the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity process, I assume that log(θ) follows an AR(1) process as
log(θt) = ρlog(θt−1) + εt, t ≥ 2
with ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε) and log(θ1) ∼ N(0, σ20). Thus, ρ and σ2ε drive the idiosyncratic risk, while σ20
drives initial heterogeneity. In parameterizing this process, I follow Huggett and Ventura (1999)
and set ρ = 0.985 , σ2ε = 0.015, and σ
2
0 = 0.27. For the numerical calculations, I discretise this
process with S = 19 grid points. 18 of these are spaced evenly around zero between −4σ20 and
4σ20 , while I add an additional ultra-high income state at 5σ
2
0 . Finally, I rescale the state space
10Own calculations based on SSA data
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Θ such that the average income during working life is equal to one.
Preferences: I set the risk preference parameter to σ = 2, while I set ν = 4. The latter is
chosen in order to yield a Frisch-elasticity of labour supply of 0.5 at the average labour supply.
The relative weight on leisure in the utility function ξ is calibrated so that agents devote an
average of l¯ = 0.33 of their time endowment to the labour market. The annual interest rate is
set to 3.85%, which is the average US real interest rate since the 1960’s (World Bank (2018)).
Finally the discount factor is calibrated so that, in combination with the mortality risk, there
is no systematic bias towards borrowing or saving over the lifecycle. This leads to an annual
discount factor of 0.98.
1.5.6 The Pension Wedge in the OLG Economy
Using the above baseline calibration, the equilibrium payroll tax that balances the social security
budget is τssc = 11.3%. If, however, one considers the actual distortion induced by the pension
system, as measured by the effective marginal, the average distortion in the economy is reduced
to 4.3%.
Figure 1.2 depicts the average effective tax rate over the lifecycle as well as it’s decomposition.
Over the course of a worker’s life, the average effective tax in her cohort falls from 8.4% at age
21 to −0.8% at age 63, the last working period before retirement.
This strong decline is predominantly caused by variation in the impact of borrowing con-
straints over the lifecycle. As one would expect, young agents without sizable asset holdings
are far more likely to be borrowing constrained, with the importance of borrowing constraints
declining over the lifecycle. Even towards the end of the working life, this component does not
disappear, despite the resolution of all idiosyncratic risk. This is due to the fact that agents
expect to want to borrow against future pension payments in order to front-load consumption
during retirement, which I do not permit in this model. As borrowing constraints decrease over
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Figure 1.2: The average effective tax rate over the life-cycle
Note: Pension wedges at each age t are averaged using the distribution Λ(a, y¯, θ, t)
the working life, the private valuation of pension payments increases, leading to a larger inter-
generational redistribution component, as a larger expected benefit implies larger opportunity
cost of not financing this benefit through the private asset. Once borrowing constraints stabi-
lize in the mid 40’s, the importance of discounting takes over, causing the inter- generational
redistribution component to fall again, as workers have successively less time up until retirement
over which to discount. It does not, however, go towards zero at the end of the working life, as
workers also discount over retirement years, when the pension system no longer pays any return
to contributions, whereas the private asset would still pay the market return r.
As previously discussed, the average intra-generational redistribution component is not zero,
as workers compare the average replacement rate in the economy with their private expected
replacement rate. Due to the progressive nature of the pension system, this difference will be
positive on average, and stable over the life cycle. The second component related to redistribu-
tion, the insurance value of the progressive pension system reduces the effective tax rate slightly
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during the first half of the working life, and then tapers off quickly towards zero, as agents’
receive more and more information about their eventual replacement rate, reducing the variance,
and hence the insurance value of redistribution. It should also be noted that this insurance
value is very small compared to the average intra-generational redistribution component, giving
a first suggestion that, at least from the point of view of marginal tax rates, a linear pension
system may have some advantages over a progressive system. Here it should be noted, however,
that this only considers the desirability of marginally more insurance, and not the value of all
insurance provided by the system. The way to consider this insurance value is as the marginal
valuation agents attach to the insurance provided by the last dollar of their earnings, given all
the insurance provided by the pension system through their average earnings.
Finally, the demographic component is sizable and reduces the effective rate by a constant
amount for each cohort. As discussed previously, the component includes both the effect of
population growth as well as the benefits of annuitisation as workers have to pay lower payroll
taxes in order to insure themselves against longevity risk when annuities are available (or in this
case provided though public pensions).
Due to the strongly progressive nature of the pension system, a natural question to ask is if
the resulting effective tax rate will display a similar degree of progressivity. In order to answer
this question, figure 1.3 displays the average effective tax rate by income group for each cohort.
Income groups here are defined the same as in Feldstein and Samwick (1992), in that they
correspond to the current ’bracket’ of the pension system the worker would fall into if she were
to earn this amount over her entire life.
Contrary to the previous literature, I find that there is no significant spread between the
effective marginal tax rates of low-, medium-, and high-income workers. This, of course, is
partially driven by the imperfect correlation of current to lifetime income. As the literature
following Feldstein and Samwick (1992) does not consider idiosyncratic risk, current earnings are
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Figure 1.3: The average effective tax rate over the life-cycle by current income
Note: Pension wedges at each age t are averaged using the conditional distribution Λ(a, y¯, θ, t|y)
the same as expected lifetime earnings. Thus, a low income worker at age 21 knows that they
will enjoy a marginal replacement rate of 90%, while a worker in a more realistic lifecycle model
will need to form expectations about their lifetime income given the presence of idiosyncratic
shocks. This, however, cannot explain the second, more surprising insight, namely that the
low-income workers do not, in fact, have the lowest effective marginal tax rate for most of their
working lives. Given that there is at least some positive correlation between current and lifetime
incomes, one would intuitively expect that low income workers should expect to receive the
highest replacement rates and hence have the lowest effective marginal tax rates. However, as
the graph shows, they actually have the highest effective rates over the entire lifecycle. Since this
clearly cannot be explained by imperfect correlations between current and lifetime incomes, I will
instead turn to the decompositions of these tax rates in order to gain a better understanding.
Considering figures 1.4 to 1.6, we can see that while the effective marginal tax rates may not
vary strongly with income within each cohort, the decomposition thereof does vary significantly.
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Figure 1.4: The average effective tax rate over the life-cycle - low income
Note: Pension wedges at each age t are averaged using the conditional distribution Λ(a, y¯, θ, t|yl)
Figure 1.5: The average effective tax rate over the life-cycle - medium income
Note: Pension wedges at each age t are averaged using the conditional distribution Λ(a, y¯, θ, t|ym)
Figure 1.6: The average effective tax rate over the life-cycle - high income
Note: Pension wedges at each age t are averaged using the conditional distribution Λ(a, y¯, θ, t|yh)
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As we can see, the intra-generational redistribution component does indeed rise significantly
with income. This suggests that the progressive nature of the pension system does indeed ’bleed
through’ into the effective marginal tax rates, as workers with high current incomes expect
significantly lower marginal replacement rate than those with lower incomes. However, this
effect is counteracted, and even overpowered, by the impact of borrowing constraints, which
affect low-income workers much more severely than those with current medium or high incomes.
High-income workers ,in particular, are almost unaffected by borrowing constraints during their
working life, instead only caring about their inability to front-load consumption during retirement
due to the annuity-like nature of pension payments. Finally, it should be noted that even for
low-income workers, the intra-generational redistribution component is strictly positive over their
entire working life, as even their expected replacement rate lies below the average replacement
rate in the economy due to imperfect correlation between current and lifetime income.11
1.6 Policy Experiment - Equalizing Replacement Rates
The previous section demonstrates that out of the two effects of nonlinear pensions, a distri-
butional component that, on average, increases the effective tax and an insurance component
that decreases it, the distributional component is larger by far. This suggests that an intuitive
reform targeted at reducing the labour supply distortion arising from the pension system would
be to equalize replacement rates by replacing the current pension schedule with a flat schedule
that pays the current average replacement rate to each worker regardless of income history. In-
tuitively, this will remove the intra-generational redistribution component, as each agent now
perceives the average replacement rate as their expected marginal replacement rate.
11If one were to redo the above graphs in terms of current lifetime, instead of current annual income, the intra-
generational redistribution component would, of course, turn negative for low lifetime income workers towards the
end of their lives, as their expected marginal replacement rate would move ever closer to 90%, while the average
replacement rate stays constant at 42%.
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Figure 1.7: The average effective tax rate over the life-cycle - Linear Schedule
Note: Pension wedges at each age t are averaged using the distribution Λ(a, y¯, θ, t)
With the above parameterization, the average replacement rate in the economy is 41.9%.
Thus, I define the new pension schedule
B˜t(y¯) =

0.419 ·min(y¯, yˆ) , t ≥ R
0 , o.w.
Using the same parameterization as previously, I solve the lifecycle model again for this pension
schedule. Once again, the average tax rate 1 − λ and the social security payroll tax τssc will
adjust in order to balance the social security, and government budget, respectively.
Figure 1.7 depicts the average effective tax rate of the pension system under a proportional
benefit rule, as well as its decomposition. As we can see, the average effective tax rate lies below
that of the current US pension system for every cohort. Averaging over all cohorts, this reform
would reduce the average effective rate from 4.3% to 0.7%. This decline in the effective marginal
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rate causes the aggregate income in the economy to increase by 1.1%, as workers supply more
efficiency units of labour to the market.
Considering the decomposition of the effective tax rate under a linear benefit rule, we find
that, as expected, the intra-generational component as well as the insurance value are zero. Since
the former outweighs the latter under the current system, this leads to a net decline in the ef-
fective rate. We do, however, also find that the impact of borrowing constraints, as well as of
inter- generational redistribution is increased. This is simply due to the fact that both terms
are multiplicative in workers’ expectations of their eventual replacement rate. Since this rate in-
creases on average when replacing the strongly progressive with a linear pension system in which
everyone faces the average as their marginal replacement rate, so will the two aforementioned
components. Finally, the demographic component is unchanged, as this reform will not impact
any of the demographics of the model.
It should be noted, that these results do not immediately imply that such a reform would be
desirable. The above analysis is only concerned with the effect of such a reform on effective
marginal tax rates, and hence, on labour supply. This, however, is not the only effect of this
reform, as the current progressive pension system also provides insurance to workers against bad
lifetime income histories. As I have discussed previously, the insurance value under the current
system represents the marginal valuation workers attach to the insurance provided by their last
dollar of earned income, given the insurance already provided by their infra-marginal earnings
through the pension system. Thus, moving from a currently progressive, to a linear pension
system will have significant impact on consumption insurance, which is not captured by the
marginal valuation of insurance.
In order to arrive at a final conclusion whether such a reform would be desirable, one would
need to weigh the loss of consumption insurance over income histories against increased efficiency
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in the labour market, which, for the moment, I leave to future research.12
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I theoretically and quantitatively investigate the distortions to labour supply in-
duced by a pay-as-you-go pension system such as the US Social Security System.
In the first part of the paper, I demonstrate that, contrary to the approximation approaches
taken by the previous literature, it is possible to calculate the effective marginal tax rates of
the pension system directly from the first order conditions of an optimizing household in a het-
erogeneous agent lifecycle model. This approach has the advantage of allowing a decomposition
of the effective tax rate into five principal components. As social security contributions pay a
return less than the market rate, there is an inter-generational redistribution component, as all
non-initial generations pay towards the windfall gain of the first generation of pensioners that
got to enjoy the benefits of a PAYGO pension without making any contributions. Second, due
to the nonlinear nature of the US pension system, there is an intra-generational redistribution
component. In the presence of mortality risk and population growth, there is a demographic
component to the effective marginal tax rate, which is driven by the relative measure of workers
to pensioners. Fourth, since pensions and savings are only substitutes for a worker who is not
borrowing constrained, there is a component driven by borrowing constraints. Finally, there is
an insurance value to a nonlinear pension, as workers may value pension payments differently,
depending on the income history they experienced.
In the second part of the paper, I calibrate the lifecycle to the US economy and quantify the
effective marginal tax rates of the US pension system. The average effective rate is significantly
12A key consideration to keep in mind when conducting such a study is that removing intra-generational
redistribution from the pension system will increase overall inequality in the economy. Thus, when deciding on a
welfare criterion, it is important to ensure that any welfare gains or losses through this reform are not simply a
result of the welfare weights, in the sense that they correct for (or exacerbate) an inefficient level of redistribution
in the status quo.
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below the statutory rate of 11%, at 4%. I find that, despite the highly progressive nature
of the US pension system, the effective tax rates do not exhibit the large spread that has been
suggested in the previous literature. Indeed, effective marginal rates are non-monotone in income
with low income households facing the highest effective tax rate and medium income household
the lowest. This relatively narrow spread, however, does not imply that there are no differences
by income groups, as the decomposition of the effective marginal tax rate reveals significant
heterogeneity. While for low income workers borrowing constraints play a very important role in
determining the effective tax rate, the effective rate of high income workers is driven, to a large
extend, by intra-generational redistribution. Finally, I note that the average insurance value is
quantitatively insignificant, especially when compared to the second component that is directly
driven by the progressive structure of the pension system, the intra-generational redistribution
component. Since the latter increases the effective tax rate, on average, significantly more than
the former reduces it, this suggests that the net effect of the progressive structure of the pension
system on labour supply may be negative.
Guided by this last insight, I investigate the effects of a reform that replaces the current,
progressive, pension schedule with a linear schedule paying the same average replacement rate to
all workers. I find that this reform reduces the average effective tax rate of the pension system
by more than 3% points, leading to an increase in effective labour supply of 1% over the status
quo.
It is important to once again reiterate that this finding alone is not sufficient to make a
convincing case for a reform of the pension system in this spirit. This is due to the fact that
removing progressivity from the system will also impact the consumption insurance enjoyed by
workers over the course of their lives. In order to adequately weigh these two effects, future
research is warranted.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
During retirement, agents solve
Vt (a, y¯R) = max
c,a′
u(c) + βψt+1Vt+1 (a
′, y¯R) (1.8)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ B (y¯R) + (1 + (1− τa) r) a (1.9)
as well as a′ ≥ 0 and VT+1(·, ·) = 0.
The resulting first order conditions are
uc(·)− λ = 0 (1.10)
−λ+ βλ′ + µ = 0, (1.11)
where λ denotes the multiplier of the budget constraint, µ denotes the multiplier on the borrowing
constraint and the second equation uses the envelope condition for a′.
This leads to the standard inter-temporal optimality condition
uc(c) ≥ ψt+1β(1 + (1− τa))ruc(c′), (1.12)
which holds with equality when the borrowing constraint does not bind. There is no more risk
(except for mortality) in this part of the agents’ life and hence solving this model is equivalent to
solving a standard cake eating problem with the trivial extension that agents receive an additional
portion of cake (their pension) in each period. Note that upon entering retirement, the statistic
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of lifetime income stops updating and the relevant state is y¯R for all retirement periods.
During working life, agents solve
Vt (a, y¯, θ) = max
c,a′,y
u (c, l) + ψt+1βEt [Vt+1 (a′, y¯′, θ′)] , (1.13)
subject to the budget constraint
c+ a′ ≤ y − T(y)−min(y, y¯)τ + (1 + (1− τa) r) a (1.14)
as well as a0 = y¯0 = 0, a
′ ≥ 0, l = yθ , and the law of motion for y¯
y¯t+1 =

(1 + i) (t−1)y¯t+min(y,yˆ)t , t ≤ R− 1
y¯t, t > R.
The first order conditions of this problem are
uc(·)− λ = 0 (1.15)
−λ+ βψt+1Et ∂Vt+1(·)
∂a′
+ µ = 0 (1.16)
ul(·)1
θ
+ λ [1− T′(y)− 1y<y¯τ ] + βψt+1Et ∂Vt+1(·)
∂y¯′
∂y¯′
∂y
= 0. (1.17)
Substituting in for the multiplier on the budget constraint and using the envelope condition
∂Vt+1(·)
∂a′ = (1 + (1− τa) r)λ′, the system of equations becomes
uc(·) = βψt+1 (1 + (1− τa) r)Etuc(c′, l′) + µ (1.18)
ul(·)1
θ
+ uc(·) [1− T′(y)− 1y<y¯τ ] + βψt+1Et ∂Vt+1(·)
∂y¯′
∂y¯′
∂y
= 0. (1.19)
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While the inter-temporal optimality condition is not affected by the presence of the pension
system, the optimal labour- leisure choice now has an added inter-temporal component. This is
because current income affects the statistic y¯, which in turn affects the pension to be paid during
retirement. In order to make this second formula more intuitive, consider the envelope condition
on y¯. For working periods t = 1, ..., R − 1, we have ∂Vt∂y¯ = (1 + i)βψt+1Et ∂Vt+1∂y¯′ t−1t , because y¯
does not enter agents’ budget constraints in pre-retirement periods. Continuing to use this, we
can forward substitute this equation into itself until we reach the first period of retirement, i.e
we have
∂Vt
∂y¯
= (1 + i)R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+qEt
∂VR
∂y¯R
t− 1
R− 1 . (1.20)
On the other hand, during a retirement period t = R, ..., T , the envelope condition will be
given by
∂Vt
∂y¯
= λB(y¯)′ + βψt+1
∂Vt+1
∂y¯′
∂y¯′
∂y¯
= λB′(y¯) + βψt+1λ′B′(y¯′)
∂y¯′
y¯
+ β2ψt+1ψt+2
∂Vt+2
∂y¯′′
∂y¯′′
∂y¯′
∂y¯′
∂y¯
= ...
(1.21)
Now, using the fact that during retirement, there is no updating to the state y¯, i.e. ∂y¯
′
∂y¯ = 1, and
using (1.10), we can write this as
∂Vt
∂y¯
= B′(y¯)
T∑
s=t
βs−t
s−t∏
q=1
ψt+quc(cs), (1.22)
and hence
∂VR
∂y¯
= B′(y¯)
T∑
s=R
βs−R
s−R∏
q=1
ψR+quc(cs). (1.23)
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Substituting this into (1.20), we get the full envelope condition for y¯, namely
∂Vt
∂y¯
=
t− 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+qEt
B′(y¯R) T∑
s˜=R
βs˜−R
s˜−R∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜uc(cs˜)
 . (1.24)
While this may not look particularly intuitive at first sight, it has a lot of parallels to the
envelope condition for assets. Primarily, both depend crucially on the marginal utility of con-
sumption in future periods. This should not come as a surprise to readers as pensions can be
interpreted as forced savings.
I measure labour distortions as the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between
labour and leisure and the marginal rate of transformation. I.e. I define
τ˜ twedge = 1−
MRS
MRT
,
which in my context is given by
τ˜ twedge = 1−
ul(·)
uc(·)θ .
Substituting the first order condition (1.5), the envelope condition for y¯ (1.24) into this formula,
and using the fact that ∂y¯
′
∂y =
1+i
t , will yield the effective marginal tax rate as
τ˜
t
wedge = T
′
(yt) + 1yt<y¯
τ − 1
R− 1 (1 + i)
R−t
β
R−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+qEt
B′(y¯R) T∑
s˜=R
β
s˜−R
s˜−R∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜
uc(cs˜)
uc (ct, lt)
 . (1.25)
Thus, the effective marginal tax rate of workers can be separated additively into a tax and a
pension component, the second one of which we denote by
τ
t
wedge = 1yt<y¯
τ − 1
R− 1 (1 + i)
R−t
β
R−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+qEt
B′(y¯R) T∑
s˜=R
β
s˜−R
s˜−R∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜
uc(cs˜)
uc (ct, lt)
 , (1.26)
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which gives the required result.
Proof of Proposition 2
The effective marginal tax rate of the pension system in the two period model is given by
τwedge = τ − 1 + i
1 + r
uc(c2)
uc(c1, l1)
B′(y1).
Replacing the payroll tax with its expression in terms of the average replacement rate, and
substituting in the Euler equation uc(c1, l1) = uc(c2) + µ yields
τwedge = b
1
1 + g
− 1 + i
1 + r
B′(y1) +
1 + i
1 + r
B′(y1)− 1 + i
1 + r
uc(c2)
uc(c2) + µ
B′(y1)
= b
1
1 + g
− 1 + i
1 + r
B′(y1) +
1 + i
1 + r
µ
uc(c2) + µ
B′(y1)
= b
1
1 + g
− 1 + i
1 + r
[B′ − b+ b] + 1 + i
1 + r
µ
uc(c2) + µ
B′(y1)
= b
1
1 + g
− 1 + i
1 + r
b+
1 + i
1 + r
[b− B′] + 1 + i
1 + r
µ
uc(c2) + µ
B′(y1)
= b
[
1
1 + g
− 1 + 1− 1 + i
1 + r
]
+
1 + i
1 + r
[b− B′] + 1 + i
1 + r
µ
uc(c2) + µ
B′(y1)
= b
r − i
1 + r
+
1 + i
1 + r
(b− B′)− b g
1 + g
+
1 + i
1 + r
B′
µ
uc(c2) + µ
,
Finally, we want to remove the time discounting effects from the term for intra-generational
redistribution and the borrowing constraints. We can do this by employing exactly the same
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technique as above to get
τwedge = b
r − i
1 + r
+
1 + i
1 + r
(b− B′)− (b− B′) + (b− B′)−
b
g
1 + g
+
1 + i
1 + r
B′
µ
uc(c2) + µ
− B′ µ
uc(c2) + µ
+ B′
µ
uc(c2) + µ
=
r − i
1 + r
[
B′
(
1− µ1
uc(c1, l1)
)]
+ [b− B′]− b g
1 + g
+ B′
µ1
uc(c2, l1)
=
r − i
1 + r
[
u′(c2)
u′(c1)
B′
]
+ [b− B′]− b g
1 + g
+ B′
µ1
uc(c2, l1)
,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
In a three-period model, the effective marginal tax rates at each age are given by
τ1wedge = τ − (1 + i)2β2
∫
θ2
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
1
2
B′(y¯)dFθ2
τ2wedge = τ − (1 + i)β
uc(c3)
uc(c2, l2)
1
2
B′(y¯)
Proving the result for the second period tax rate is a simple application of proposition 2, with
the growth rate exchanged for the ratio of average lifetime income to total taxable income Y¯∑Y .
Hence, I will only discuss the result for the first period rate.
Replacing the payroll tax rate with its corresponding expression as a function of the average
replacement rate, we get
τ1wedge = b
Y¯∑
Y
− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
∫
θ2
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
B′(y¯)dFθ2.
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First, we use a standard result from statistics
E[A ·B] = E[A]E[B] + Cov(A,B)
in order to separate the idiosyncratic replacement rate and the corresponding utility weights to
get
τ1wedge = b
Y¯∑
Y
− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
∫
θ2
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
dFθ2
∫
θ2
B′(y¯)dFθ2−
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
Cov
(
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
,B′(y¯)
)
= b
Y¯∑
Y
− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
∫
θ2
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
dFθ2
∫
θ2
B′(y¯)dFθ2+
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
∫
θ2
B′(y¯)dFθ2 − (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
∫
θ2
B′(y¯)dFθ2−
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
Cov
(
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
,B′(y¯)
)
.
This step allows for a separation of the insurance premium component of the tax rate. Next, we
can replace the integral over the utility weights with its corresponding expression in terms of the
borrowing constraints by using the Euler equation
τ1wedge = b
Y¯∑
Y
− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
∫
θ2
uc(c3)dFθ2∫
θ2
uc(c3)dFθ2 + µ1 +
∫
θ2
µ2dFθ2
∫
θ2
B′(y¯)dFθ2+
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
∫
θ2
B′(y¯)dFθ2 − (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
∫
θ2
B′(y¯)dFθ2−
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
Cov
(
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
,B′(y¯)
)
= b
Y¯∑
Y
− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
E [B′] +
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
E [µ1 + µ2]
E [uc(c3)] + E [µ1 + µ2]
E [B′]− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
Cov
(
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
,B′(y¯)
)
.
This step separates out the effect of borrowing constraints on the effective tax rate. All that
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remains at this stage is to separate the first line of the above expression into the inter- and
intra-generational redistribution component as well as the demographic component.
To separate out the intra-generational redistribution component, we write
τ1wedge = b
Y¯∑
Y
− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
E [B′] +
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
b− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
b+
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
E [µ1 + µ2]
E [uc(c3)] + E [µ1 + µ2]
E [B′]− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
Cov
(
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
,B′(y¯)
)
= b
Y¯∑
Y
+
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
[b− E [B′]]− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
b+
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
E [µ1 + µ2]
E [uc(c3)] + E [µ1 + µ2]
E [B′]− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
Cov
(
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
,B′(y¯)
)
.
Finally, we can separate the inter-generational and the demographic component as follows
τ1wedge = b
[
Y¯
2
∑
1
2Y
− 1
2
+
1
2
− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
]
+
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
[b− E [B′]] +
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
1
2
E [µ1 + µ2]
E [uc(c3)] + E [µ1 + µ2]
E [B′]− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
1
2
Cov
(
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
,B′(y¯)
)
=
1
2
[
b
(1 + r)2 − (1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
+
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
[b− E [B′]]− b
∑
Y − Y¯∑
Y
+
(1 + i)2
(1 + r)2
E [µ1 + µ2]
E [uc(c3)] + E [µ1 + µ2]
E [B′]− (1 + i)
2
(1 + r)2
Cov
(
uc(c3)
uc(c1, l1)
,B′(y¯)
)]
.
To complete the proof, we now simply separate the time discounting factors, using the same
technique as in the previous proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
In the general model, the effective marginal tax rate of the pension system in period t is given
by
τ
t
wedge = 1yt<yˆ
τ − 1
R− 1β
R−t
(1 + i)
R−t
T∑
s¯=R
β
s¯−R
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+qEt
[
B′(y¯R)
uc(cs˜)
uc (ct, lt)
] .
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In order to express the entire marginal tax rate in terms of benefits, rather than the payroll
tax, I will first replace the payroll tax by its corresponding expression in terms of the average
replacement rate.
Since we have constant population growth, I will normalize each cohort with the size of the
cohort of current fresh retirees. Thus, the cohort of workers currently in their last working period
is of size (1 + g)(2− ψR), while that of retirees of age R+ 1 is of size 11+gψR+1.
Thus, the revenue generated by the pension system is
R˜ = τ
R−1∑
s=1
(1 + g)s
s−1∏
q=0
(2− ψR−q)
∫
ΩR−s
min(yR−s, yˆ)dθR−s,
where Ω denotes the set of histories of θ, which together with the starting conditions on the
states for assets and average income fully characterise the state space.
On the other hand, the spending side of the pension system is given by
∫
ΩR
B(y¯R)dθR
T−R∑
s˜=0
(1 + g)−s˜
s˜∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜
 ,
which is simply the total pension benefits per cohort multiplied with the total measure of pen-
sioners relative to ’fresh’ retirees, taking into account population growth and mortality risk.
Using the budget balance equation R˜ = S˜, we get
τ =
∫
ΩR
B(y¯R)dθR
[∑T−R
s˜=0 (1 + g)
−s˜∏s˜
q˜=1 ψR+q˜
]
∑R−1
s=1 (1 + g)
s
∏s−1
q=0(2− ψR−q)
∫
ΩR−s
min(yR−s, yˆ)dθR−s
.
In order to get a meaningful replacement rate, I will normalize the above with the average taxable
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lifetime income of the current generation of newly retired agents
τ =
1
R− 1
∫
ΩR
B(y¯R)dθR
1
R−1
∑R−1
t=1
∫
Ωt
min(yt, yˆ)dθt
·
∑R−1
t=1
∫
Ωt
min(yt, yˆ)dθ
t∑R−1
s=1 (1 + g)
s
∏s−1
q=0(2− ψR−q)
∫
ΩR−s
min(yR−s, yˆ)dθR−s
·T−R∑
s˜=0
(1 + g)−s˜
s˜∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜
 .
Here, the term on the first line is the average replacement rate of the pension system, the term
on the second line is the ratio of the total taxable income of current fresh retirees over their
lifecycle to the taxable income to the economy right now. This ratio will generally be smaller
than one due to population growth as well as mortality risk. Finally, the term on the third line
denotes to total measure of pensioners in the economy. Denoting the average replacement rate
by b, the total taxable income of current fresh pensioners by
∑
Y˜ , and the total taxable income
by
∑
Y , we can write
τ = b
1
R− 1
T−R∑
s˜=0
(1 + g)−s˜
s˜∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜
 ∑ Y˜∑
Y
.
Just as in the proof for the previous result, we will use the identity
E [A ·B] = E [A] ·E [B] + Cov (A,B)
to separate out the insurance component from the formulation for the effective tax rate. To keep
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the notation as concise as possible, I will substitute out for τ at a later date.
τ twedge = 1y≤yˆ
[
τ − 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯
·E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
− 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
.
In a next step, I will separate out the expected replacement rate from the borrowing constraints
τ twedge = 1y≤yˆ
[
τ − 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯
·E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
+
1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯ ·E [B′(y¯R)]
− 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯ ·E [B′(y¯R)]
− 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
.
τ twedge = 1y≤yˆ
[
τ − 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯E [B′(y¯R)]
+
1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯ ·E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
− 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
.
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Following this, I will separate out the effects of intra-temporal redistribution
τ twedge = 1y≤yˆ
[
τ − 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯E [B′(y¯R)]
+
1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯b
− 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯b
+
1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯ ·E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
− 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
.
τ twedge = 1y≤yˆ
[
τ − 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯b
+
1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯E [b− B′(y¯R)]
+
1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯ ·E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
− 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
.
Now we are ready to separate out the demographic component by substituting τ with its corre-
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sponding expression in terms of the average replacement rate.
τ twedge = 1y≤yˆ
[
b
1
R− 1
T−R∑
s˜=0
(1 + g)−s˜
s˜∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜
 ∑ Y˜∑
Y
+
T∑
s¯=R
b−
T∑
s¯=R
b
− 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯b
+
1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯E [b− B′(y¯R)]
+
1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯ ·E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
− 1
R− 1(1 + i)
R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
.
τ twedge =
1y≤yˆ
R− 1
[[
T∑
s¯=R
1− (1 + i)R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯
]
b
+ (1 + i)R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯E [b− B′(y¯R)]
−
 T∑
s¯=R
1−
T−R∑
s˜=0
(1 + g)−s˜
s˜∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜
∑
Y˜∑
Y
 b
+ (1 + i)R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯ ·E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
− (1 + i)R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
.
In a final step, I separate out the inter-generational redistribution component, by collecting
the discounting factors, indexing terms, and survival probabilities from the intra-generational,
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borrowing constraint, and insurance components.
τ twedge =
1y≤yˆ
R− 1
[[
T∑
s¯=R
1− (1 + i)R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯
]
b
+ (1 + i)R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯E [b− B′(y¯R)]
−
T∑
s¯=R
E [b−B′(y¯R)] +
T∑
s¯=R
E [b−B′(y¯R)]
−
 T∑
s¯=R
1−
T−R∑
s˜=0
(1 + g)−s˜
s˜∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜
∑
Y˜∑
Y
 b
+ (1 + i)R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯ ·E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
−
T∑
s¯=R
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
− (1 + i)R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)
−
T∑
s¯=R
Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)
+
T∑
s¯=R
Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
.
In order to simplify this expression, I rewrite the following two sums
T∑
s¯=R
1− (1 + i)R−tβR−t
R−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
T∑
s¯=R
βs¯−R
s¯−R∏
q¯=1
ψR+q¯
=
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + i)R−tβs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
]
T∑
s¯=R
1−
T−R∑
s˜=0
(1 + g)−s˜
s˜∏
q˜=1
ψR+q˜
∑
Y˜∑
Y
=
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + g)−(s¯−R)
s¯−R∏
q=1
ψR+q
∑
Y˜∑
Y
]
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Then the above becomes
τ twedge =
1y≤yˆ
R− 1
[
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + i)R−tβs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
]
·
[
E [B′(y¯R)]
(
1−E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
+ Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [b−B′(y¯R)]
−
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + g)−(s¯−R)
s¯−R∏
q=1
ψR+q
∑
Y˜∑
Y
]
b
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
−
T∑
s¯=R
Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
.
While the above formulation already separates the effective marginal tax rate into its five
components, their interpretation does not yet carry over one-to-one from the case with a single
pension period without mortality. This is due to the fact that in this case, the simple identity
β(1 + r) = 1 no longer holds. Thus, the fourth term in the above equation can no longer be
interpreted directly as a borrowing constraint, since the Euler equation is no longer given by
uc(ct) ≥ E [uc(ct+1)], but rather by
uc(ct) ≥ (1 + (1− τa)r)βψt+1E [uc(ct+1)] .
Thus, in order to get the correct formulation of the borrowing constraints, I transform the above
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as follows
τ twedge =
1y≤yˆ
R− 1
[
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + i)R−tβs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
]
·
[
E [B′(y¯R)]
(
1−E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
+ Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [b−B′(y¯R)]
−
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + g)−(s¯−R)
s¯−R∏
q=1
ψR+q
∑
Y˜∑
Y
]
b
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− (1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−tβs¯−t
∏s¯−t
q=1 ψt+quc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
−
T∑
s¯=R
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− (1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−tβs¯−t
∏s¯−t
q=1 ψt+quc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
−
T∑
s¯=R
Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
,
which can be simplified to
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τ twedge =
1y≤yˆ
R− 1
[
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + i)R−tβs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
]
·
[
E [B′(y¯R)]
(
1−E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
+ Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [b−B′(y¯R)]
−
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + g)−(s¯−R)
s¯−R∏
q=1
ψR+q
∑
Y˜∑
Y
]
b
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− (1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−tβs¯−t
∏s¯−t
q=1 ψt+quc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
+
T∑
s¯=R
[
(1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−tβs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+q − 1
]
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
−
T∑
s¯=R
Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
.
In addition to adjusting the borrowing constraint, we will also have to adjust the insurance
value. In this term, we are normalizing the marginal utility of consumption in period s¯ with the
current marginal utility of consumption in period t. However, since we now have mortality risk
as well as capital gains taxation, the correct Euler equation to use when comparing marginal
utilities is actually
uc(ct, lt) ≥ (1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−t βs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+quc(cs¯).
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Hence, we rewrite the above as
τ twedge =
1y≤yˆ
R− 1
[
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + i)R−tβs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+q
]
·
[
E [B′(y¯R)]
(
1−E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
+ Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [b−B′(y¯R)]
−
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + g)−(s¯−R)
s¯−R∏
q=1
ψR+q
∑
Y˜∑
Y
]
b
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− (1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−tβs¯−t
∏s¯−t
q=1 ψt+quc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
+
T∑
s¯=R
[
(1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−tβs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+q − 1
]
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
−
T∑
s¯=R
Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)
+
T∑
s¯=R
(1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−t βs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+qCov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)
−
T∑
s¯=R
(1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−t βs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+qCov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
,
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which can be simplified to
τ twedge =
1y≤yˆ
R− 1
[
T∑
s¯=R
[
(1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−t − (1 + i)R−t
]
βs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+q ·
[
E [B′(y¯R)]
(
1−E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
+ Cov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [b−B′(y¯R)]
−
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + g)−(s¯−R)
s¯−R∏
q=1
ψR+q
∑
Y˜∑
Y
]
b
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− (1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−tβs¯−t
∏s¯−t
q=1 ψt+quc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
−
T∑
s¯=R
(1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−t βs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+qCov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
,
Finally, in order to arrive at the desired result, I once again use the identity
E [A ·B] = E [A] ·E [B] + Cov (A,B)
to write
τ twedge =
1y≤yˆ
R− 1
[
T∑
s¯=R
[
(1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−t − (1 + i)R−t
]
βs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+qE
[
B
′(y¯R)
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [b−B′(y¯R)]
−
T∑
s¯=R
[
1− (1 + g)−(s¯−R)
s¯−R∏
q=1
ψR+q
∑
Y˜∑
Y
]
b
+
T∑
s¯=R
E [B′(y¯R)]E
[
uc(ct, lt)− (1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−tβs¯−t
∏s¯−t
q=1 ψt+quc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
]
−
T∑
s¯=R
(1 + (1− τa)r)s¯−t βs¯−t
s¯−t∏
q=1
ψt+qCov
(
B′(y¯R),
uc(cs¯)
uc(ct, lt)
)]
,
which completes the proof. 
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Chapter 2
Lifetime Taxation in a
Heterogenous Agent Framework
2.1 Introduction
A key characteristic of the progressive income tax system employed in most developed economies
is that households with volatile incomes pay a higher amount of taxes over their lives than
those who earn the same amount of lifetime income at a constant rate. As I demonstrate in
the context of a standard lifecycle model, households with the same level of lifetime income pay
average lifetime taxes that can differ by up to 5%-points. This significant variation is due to
the fact that steady income earners maximise the share of their lifetime income that is taxed
at lower rates, while households with volatile incomes will see a larger share of their income fall
into high tax brackets.
This unequal treatment of households with the same lifetime resources prompted Vickrey
(1939) and Vickrey (1947) to propose a tax averaging procedure to equalise the tax burden
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between households of equal lifetime income. However, while various tax averaging procedures
have been in place throughout the 20’th century1, to my knowledge no such provision is currently
in operation in a major economy today.
What has been missing from the discussion about the desirability of such an averaging pro-
cedure to date is a thorough investigation in a formal economic model that makes credible
assumptions about the sources of the underlying income volatility. While Liebman (2002) makes
a start into this direction, he does so in a model without uncertainty, with households enjoying
perfect foresight over their future, volatile, incomes. As I show below, this modeling assumption
is not without loss of generality, both when it comes to discussing the equity, as well as the
efficiency implications of a tax on lifetime income.
The first half of this paper is concerned with the equity implications of a tax on lifetime
income. To this end, I reconsider the classical argument for lifetime taxation in a model with
perfect foresight. I show that the unambiguous welfare gains found in such a model depend
crucially on two key characteristic implied by the perfect foresight assumption. First, if house-
holds enjoy perfect foresight, then a household’s lifetime income together with the spread of this
income is a sufficient statistic to characterize the solution to the household’s optimization prob-
lem. Second, in the case of annual taxation, it is possible to use the spread of lifetime income to
rank households by their consumption, with low-spread households enjoying the highest level of
consumption. Since a transition to a lifetime income tax will equalize consumption within each
level of lifetime income in a world with perfect foresight, such a reform will lead to unambiguous
welfare gains. As similar arguments cannot be made, however, for the case where households
face idiosyncratic risk, I then conduct a quantitative analysis of the welfare effect in a lifecylce
model with idiosyncratic risk. I show that, contrary to the ’perfect foresight’ benchmark, a tran-
1See Vickrey (1939) for a description of a short-lived averaging procedure in Wisconsin, Copland (1924) for
tax averaging in Australia, and Schmalbeck (1984) and Liebman (2002) for a discussion of US tax averaging from
1964 to 1986.
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sition to a tax on lifetime income will lead to a small welfare loss equivalent to 0.16% of average
consumption. This comes from the fact that workers increase savings, and hence back-load their
consumption in order to insure against uncertain future tax payments.
In the second half of the paper, I turn to the question of whether a shift to lifetime income
taxation can have positive effects on efficiency.
In a first step, I once again revisit the world of perfect foresight and demonstrate that the
assumption of perfectly constant marginal tax rates over the lifecycle in Liebman (2002) only
holds in the absence of borrowing constraints. If workers are borrowing constrained, they value
the increase in contemporaneous consumption through increased earnings more strongly than
the future consumption they will have to forgo in order to pay taxes on these increased earnings
in the future. This effect will depress effective marginal tax rates below the level of the ex-post
marginal tax rate faced by the household.
In a second step I then turn to effective marginal tax rates of a lifetime income tax in a model
with idiosyncratic risk. I derive a formula for these and show that they can be decomposed into i)
an expected ex-post marginal tax rate, ii) the effect of borrowing constraints, and iii) the effect of
insurance against adverse lifetime incomes which will lead households to value lost consumption
through taxes less strongly if this occurs in a state where they have enjoyed an income history
leading to high lifetime incomes. Additionally, I demonstrate that in the presence of idiosyncratic
risk, the effective tax rate is no longer independent of the question of when taxes are collected.
If the government chooses to collect taxes not only at the end of the working life, but also
at intermediate points, intermediate borrowing constraints will start to impact the households
labour supply decision, leading to an increase in the effective marginal tax rate.
I then present some approximations of the effective marginal tax rates and their decompo-
sitions, demonstrating the the effects of borrowing constraints and insurance will depress the
effective marginal tax rate below the expected ex-post rate during the first part of the working
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life. As more and more uncertainty is resolved, the effective marginal tax rate converges towards
workers’ expectation about their ex-post tax rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews the related
literature. Section 2.3 considers the equity implications of a move to lifetime income taxation,
while 2.4 considers the effects of such a reform on the distortions to households labour supply
decisions. Finally, section 2.5 concludes and provides an outlook on future work.
2.2 Literature Review
My paper is chiefly related to the literature on tax averaging started by Vickrey (1939) and
Vickrey (1947). In these texts, Vickrey argues for the case of tax averaging over multiple years
mainly on equity grounds. He develops specific and very involved averaging procedures to achieve
equity between workers regardless of the volatility of their income. It should be noted in this
context that Vickrey is writing with the US tax system in mind and thus is not only concerned
with labour income, but also with capital income. To my knowledge, Liebman (2002) is the
first, and so far only, paper that considers the welfare implications of such a ”Vickrey-tax” on
labour income2 in a formal economic model. In this paper, the author considers a sample of
the US population over the course of their lives and asks the question how much better they
would have been off under a tax regime in the spirit of Vickrey, finding significant positive
welfare effects. However, this paper makes several simplifying assumptions, chiefly among which
is that all uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of the lifecycle and that workers have perfect
foresight with regards to their (potentially volatile) income histories. As I will demonstrate, this
assumption will lead to certain results that do not generalize to a more realistic model with
idiosyncratic risk.
2Although Vickrey’s ideas have received some attention in the literature on capital gains taxation. See for
example Auerbach (1991), Bradford (1994), Auerbach and Bradford (2004)
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In recent years, there has been a growing interest in lifetime taxation in the New Dynamic
Public Finance Literature. Three papers are of special interest here as they concern themselves
with lifetime taxation. First, Michau (2014) derives the optimal lifetime tax schedule in a setting
with one tax payment at the end of the working life and a deterministic productivity schedule.
Second, Farhi and Werning (2013), as well as Golosov et al. (2016) derive optimal labour wedges
in a lifecycle setting setting with uncertainty. While they demonstrate that the implementation
of these optimal distortions leads significant positive welfare gains, this literature is silent with
regards to how such wedges could be implemented.
2.3 Equity Considerations
2.3.1 The Classical Argument for Lifetime Income Taxation
In this section, I will briefly discuss and formalise the classic argument for equity gains through
lifetime income taxation in a model without idiosyncratic risk that has been central of the pre-
vious literature.
As Vickrey (1939) writes in his original paper,
It has long been considered one of the principal defects of the graduated individual
income tax that fluctuating incomes are, on the whole, subjected to much heavier tax
burdens than incomes of comparable average magnitude which are relatively steady
from year to year. (p.379)
Figure 2.1 illustrates this point by depicting the average annualised lifetime tax rate3 paid by 5
million agents with simulated earnings histories from a standard lifecycle model with an AR(1)
3For every level of lifetime income (which must, of course be calculated in NPV terms), I define annualised
lifetime income as that income that would have yielded this level of lifetime income if earned at a perfectly steady
rate over the lifecycle. Annualised lifetime taxes are defined equivalently. The average annualised lifetime tax
rate is then simply the quotient of the two.
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Figure 2.1: Spread of Average Lifetime Tax Rates
The average annualised lifetime tax rate is calculated by taking the annualised NPV of taxes paid over the lifecycle
and dividing it by the annualised NPV of lifetime income
income process4. As can be seen, there is significant heterogeneity in lifetime tax payments
between agents of the same level of lifetime income. At most levels of lifetime income, this
spread between the lower contour of the figure, representing those with perfectly steady incomes,
and those with the highest volatility approaches 5%-points.
Vickrey (1939), Vickrey (1947), Vickrey (1972), and Liebman (2002) all propose reforms that
are targeted at eliminating this spread. In this paper, I will follow Liebman (2002) in considering
a reform that taxes each earnings history at the average of the lifetime taxes paid on earnings
histories with the same lifetime income under the current, annual, tax system. This type of re-
form has two distinct advantages: first, it is revenue neutral up to adjustments in labour supply,
as it collects the same amount of taxes at each level of lifetime income as the pre-reform tax
system. Second, it is distributionally neutral in the sense that it does not redistribute resources
between different levels of lifetime income. Previous reform proposals such as Vickrey (1939),
who suggested taxing every earnings history as if income had been earned at a perfectly steady
rate do not meet this requirement. Since such a reform would move every agent to the lower
4Taxes on annual income y are calculated as T (y) = y − λy1−τ with τ = 0.151 following Heathcote et al.
(2014)
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contour of figure 2.1, the revenue to the government would obviously be lower than pre-reform.
Additionally, the benefits of the reform would accrue disproportionately to those lifetime income
levels that exhibit particularly large volatility in earnings.
In order to understand why such a reform will lead to welfare improving equity gains in the
’perfect foresight’ world considered in the previous literature, I will present a two-period exam-
ple that formalizes and generalizes the argument in Liebman (2002). This example will also
demonstrate why this reasoning cannot be applied directly to a heterogeneous agent model,
necessitating a more thorough investigation by means of a quantitative model.
Specifically, consider a population distribution over earnings histories G(y1, y2), which de-
scribes the measure of agents that have experienced the earnings history y2 = {y1, y2}. This
distribution over the population can be the outcome of (at least) two types of income processes.
First, and this is the world view underlying the previous literature on lifetime taxation, agents
can draw their type y2 = {y1, y2} directly upon being born. Then, there is no more uncertainty
to be resolved over the lifecycle, and all households have perfect foresight over their earnings
histories. Second, and this is will be the focus of the next section, agents can draw a type
y1 from a distribution F (y1) upon being born, and then draw a second-period type y2 from a
conditional distribution F (y2|y1) in the second period. If, for every history y2 = {y1, y2} we
have G(y1, y2) = F (y2|y1)F (y1), the two income processes are clearly observationally equivalent
ex-post5. In the remainder of this section, I will consider the first of the two scenarios, as it
allows for a very strong result, and is the basis upon which the classic argument for lifetime
income taxation has been built.
Given an income tax schedule T (y) on annual labour income, I define the lifetime tax schedule
5In the sense that it is not possible to determine which of the two processes generated the population by simply
considering the the observed earnings histories within it
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Tˆ (y¯) on annualised lifetime income y¯ = 11+(1+r) ((1 + r)y1 + y2) by
Tˆ (y¯) =
1
1 + (1 + r)
∫
X(y¯)
[(1 + r)T (y1) + T (y2)] dG(y1, y2),
where X(y¯) denotes the set of earnings histories that will lead to an annualised lifetime income
of y¯, i.e.
X(y¯) =
{
{y1, y2} s.t. 1
1 + (1 + r)
((1 + r)y1 + y2) = y¯
}
.
Thus, under the lifetime tax schedule, a worker with lifetime income y¯ will face a tax burden
equal to the average lifetime tax burden faced by all workers of lifetime income y¯ under the
current, annual, tax system.
In order to see why a move from annual tax schedule T (·) to lifetime tax schedule Tˆ (·) can
lead to welfare gains in a setting where all uncertainty is resolved in the initial period, consider
the optimization problem facing a household that has drawn type y2 = {y1, y2} and faces the
annual tax schedule T (·)
V (y1, y2) = max
c1,c2,a2
u(c1) + βu(c2)
subject to the budget constraints
c1 = y1 − T (y1)− a2
c2 = y2 − T (y2) + (1 + r)a2.
Abstracting from borrowing constraints, and making the standard assumption β(1 + r) = 1, we
can immediately use the Euler equation to write
c1 = c2 =
1
1 + (1 + r)
((1 + r)y1 + y2)− 1
1 + (1 + r)
((1 + r)T (y1) + T (y2)) .
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Due to the assumption on the process generating this income history, households have perfect
foresight and can perfectly smooth consumption. Thus, in each period, they will consume their
annualised net lifetime resources, which is the difference between lifetime income and lifetime
taxes paid.
Now, if the tax schedule T (·) is twice continuously differentiable and progressive in the sense
that T ′′ > 0, then it is possible to show that for any given lifetime income y¯, consumption
will be decreasing in the difference between first-, and second-period income. Specifically, a
straightforward application of Taylor’s theorem (see for example Binmore (1982)) yields6
c1 = c2 ≈ y¯ − T (y¯)− T ′′(y¯)x2 (1 + r) + (1 + r)
2
2(1 + (1 + r))3
,
where x = y1 − y2. Thus, within each level of lifetime income, it is possible to rank households’
consumption (and hence welfare) based on the amount of volatility of their earnings. Households
with the lowest volatility in their earnings enjoy the highest level of consumption (for x = 0, the
third term of the above formula disappears altogether), while those with the highest volatility
face the lowest level of consumption.
On the other hand, under the lifetime tax schedule described above, the budget constraints
are given by
c1 = y1 − a2
c2 = y2 − (1 + (1 + r))Tˆ ((1 + r)y1 + y2) + (1 + r)a2,
6A similar argument will hold when the marginal tax rate is a weakly increasing step function. However, for
simplicity I will focus on the abovementioned case.
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and repeating the above analysis will yield a constant level consumption of
c1 = c2 = y¯ − Tˆ (y¯)
within each level of lifetime income. Following the definition of the tax on annualised lifetime
income, we can express this level of consumption in terms of the original, annual, tax schedule
in order to determine who wins and who loses through the reform
c1 = c2 = y¯ − 1
1 + (1 + r)
∫
X(y¯)
[(1 + r)T (y˜1) + T (y˜2)] dG(y˜1, y˜2).
Now, if for every pair {y˜1, y˜2}, we express the taxes paid on this income stream under the annual
tax system in terms of average annualised income y¯ and the difference x˜ = y˜1 − y˜2, a second
application of Taylor’s theorem will allow us to write
1
1 + (1 + r)
∫
X(y¯)
[(1 + r)T (y˜1) + T (y˜2)] dG(y˜1, y˜2) ≈
T (y¯) + T ′′(y¯)
(1 + r) + (1 + r)2
2(1 + (1 + r))3
∫
X(y¯)
x˜2dH(x˜|y¯).
Therefore, it is possible to write the consumption gain through the reform as
δ(y1, y2) ≈ T ′′(y¯) (1 + r) + (1 + r)
2
2(1 + (1 + r))3
[
(y1 − y2)2 −
∫
X(y¯)
(y˜1 − y˜2)2dG(y˜1, y˜2)
]
.
Hence, households with earnings that exhibit lower than average volatility for their level of
lifetime income will lose consumption due to the reform while those with above average volatility
will gain consumption. But as this exactly shifts consumption from high-consumption to low-
consumption households without changing their relative ranking, (as post-reform consumption
will be equalized within each lifetime income level), such a reform will lead to welfare gains under
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standard assumptions on the curvature of u(·). The following proposition will summarize our
findings so far
Proposition 5 In a two-period economy with volatile incomes, perfect foresight, and without
borrowing constraints, a move from an annual tax schedule to the lifetime income tax schedule Tˆ
will lead to unambiguous welfare gains as long as there are diminishing returns to consumption.
It is important to note that these unambiguous welfare gains are the result of two features
of the model without any idiosyncratic risk. First, agents have perfect foresight, and hence
can perfectly smooth consumption over the lifecycle. Second, and relatedly, in such a model,
an agent’s lifetime income, as well as it’s volatility are good statistics for characterizing the
household problem7. To the author’s knowledge, no such claims can be made in the case where
the distribution G(y1, y2) is the result of ex-ante heterogeneity as well as idiosyncratic risk. For
this reason, the next section will concern itself with the quantitative analysis of a shift to lifetime
income taxation in a heterogeneous agent model.
2.3.2 Lifetime Taxation in a Heterogeneous Agent Framework
Setup
In order to conduct the analysis, I build a partial equilibrium lifecycle model with ex-ante het-
erogeneity, idiosyncratic productivity risk, exogenous income, and incomplete markets.
Agents in this economy live for a maximum of T periods. They work for the first R−1 periods,
in each period inelastically supplying one period of labor to the market and then retire for the
remainder of their lives. Upon entering retirement, they face a risk of dying with probability
7In the case of a step-wise linear tax function, lifetime income and its spread x = y1−y2 are actually sufficient
statistics for earnings history, as the third moment of the tax function is zero everywhere, and a discrete version of
the Taylor approximation used above will hold with equality. This will allow us to fully characterize the solution
to each household’s problem in terms of the two statistics y¯ and x. Incidentally, if we restrict the tax function to
be linear, then lifetime income itself is a sufficient statistic for the history of earnings.
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1 − ψt+1 between periods t and t + 1, with ψT+1 = 1. Given these population dynamics, there
will be a measure µt of age t agents, and I normalise this measure such that
∑T
t=1 µt = 1.
Markets are incomplete, allowing households to save in a one period bond at an interest rate
r. I assume that agents do not have any bequest motives.
The government : In order to focus the discussion, I assume that the government only taxes
labour income in order to finance some level of wasteful government expenditure. Specifically, I
assume that the government wants to raise a constant net present value of G from each generation
over the course of their working life. It does so by collecting taxes Tt(y
t) in period t from a
household with income history yt. In the case of an annual tax (pre-reform), this will be given
by
Tt(y
t) =

T (yt) , t ≤ R− 1
0 , t > R− 1
as taxes depend only on the last realization of income. Post-reform, taxes will be raised through
a tax on annualised lifetime income that is a generalisation of the two-period case introduced
above. Specifically, for each period t I define current annualised lifetime income y¯t as
y¯t =
1∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−s
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−sys.
Taxes on annualised lifetime income are then defined as
Tˆt(y¯t) =
1∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−s
∫
X(y¯t)
[
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−sT (y˜s)
]
dG(y˜t),
where X(y¯) is once again the set of histories y˜t such that
1∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−s
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−sy˜s = y¯t.
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Having defined how taxes on lifetime income are to be calculated, next we need to define
when tax payments are due. In the simplest case, there will only be one tax payment at the end
of the households’ working lives. In this case, taxes will be collected as
Tt(y
t) =

0 , t < R− 1
∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−sTˆt(y¯t) , t = R− 1
0 , t ≥ R,
and I will refer to this case as the lifetime tax schedule without intermediate collections. It is
easy to confirm that this tax schedule will be revenue neutral as well as distributionally neutral
over levels of lifetime income compared to the underlying annual tax schedule.
However, the assumption of a single tax payment at the end of the working life is not without
loss of generality in the presence of borrowing constraints. If these constraints affect young agents
more strongly than those at the end of their working lives, then such a shift in the timing of
tax collections might lead to a welfare gain that is unrelated to the question whether or not it is
possible to provide better insurance through lifetime taxation.
In order to forestall such concerns, I will define a second tax schedule, referred to as the
lifetime tax schedule with intermediate collections, in which taxes are raised in each period and
then rebated back to the household next period as tax credits towards their future tax payments.
This will lead to a tax schedule
Tt(y
t) =

0 , t = 0
∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−sTˆt(y¯t)− (1 + r)
∑t−1
s=1(1 + r)
t−1−sTˆt−1(y¯t−1) , 1 ≤ t ≤ R− 1
0 , t > R− 1.
74 CHAPTER 2. LIFETIME TAXATION IN A HETEROGENOUS AGENT FRAMEWORK
It is important to remark that the total NPV of taxes collected on annualised lifetime income
y¯R−1 at retirement does not differ between the case with and without intermediate collections.
It is simply the timing of tax collections that is altered.
In addition to raising revenue in this way, the government will also collect all accidental
bequests and distribute them as a lump-sum payment d to each household.
Households: When they enter the economy, agents draw their initial income type θ1 from the
distribution F (θ1). For any period t > 1, income follows a Markov process with the conditional
distribution F (θt|θt−1).
In each period, workers face wages wt = γtθt, where γ is the lifecycle component of produc-
tivity that is common to all workers, whereas θ is the idiosyncratic shock. We have γt = 0 for
all t > R− 1, implying zero wages during retirement. Upon observing her wage, an agent makes
a consumption-saving decision in order to maximise her expected discounted sum of utilities,
where to flow utility in each period is given by
Ut =
c1−σt
1− σ .
Here, ct denotes consumption in period t.
Thus, the problem of a household with current assets at, past annualised lifetime earnings
y¯t−1, and current productivity θt is given by
Vt(at, y¯t−1, θt) = max
ct,at+1
c1−σt
1− σ + ψt+1βEVt+1(at+1, y¯t, θt+1) (2.1)
subject to the budget constraint
ct + at+1 ≤ yt − T(yt) + (1 + r)at + d,
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the law of motion for annualised lifetime income
y¯t =
(1 + r)
∑t−1
s=1(1 + r)
t−1−sy¯t−1 + yt∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−s ,
as well as the borrowing constraint at+1 ≥ 0, and the initial conditions a1 = y¯0 = 0.
Equilibrium definition: a partial equilibrium in the OLG economy is defined as a policy func-
tion at+1(at, y¯t−1, θt), together with a tax schedule T, a lump-sum transfer d, and a distribution
λt(at, y¯t−1, θt) such that, given the interest rate r
1. The policy function solves the household problem (2.1)
2. The government collects the required amount of taxes from every generation over their
lifecycle, i.e.
R−1∑
t=1
(1 + r)R−1−t
∫
Tt(y
t)dλt(at, y¯t−1, θt) = G
3. The lump-sum transfer is equal to the accidental bequests collected by the government
d =
T∑
t=R
µt−1(1− ψt−1)
∫
at(at−1, y¯t−2, θt−1)dλ(at−1, y¯t−2, θt−1)
4. The distribution λ is consistent with individual optimality, i.e.
λt+1(a˜t+1, ˜¯yt, θt+1) =
∫
Zt
f(θt+1|θt)dλ(at, y¯t−1, θt),
where Zt = {(at, y¯t−1, θ) s.t. at+1(at, y¯t−1, θ) = a˜t1}, as well as with the initial conditions
a1 = y¯0 = 0.
Parameterization
The parameters of the model are chosen in order to broadly reflect key characteristics of the US
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economy. Future versions of this paper will include a more careful calibration, especially with
regards to the income process and the borrowing constraints.
Demographics: Agents enter the economy at age 21 and die for sure at age 101. They do
not face mortality risk during their working life, i.e. ψt+1 = 0, t < R − 1. Age specific survival
probabilities following the entry into retirement are taken from the US life table for males (Arias
(2009)).
Taxation: The exogenous level of government spending is taken from Huggett and Ventura
(1999) and set at 19.5%. The progressivity parameter τ in the tax function on annual income,
T (y) = y − λy1−τ is set at 0.151 for the pre-reform state following Heathcote et al. (2014). The
parameter λ will adjust to balance the government budget. Note that no budget adjustment is
required for the case of lifetime income taxation as the reform is revenue neutral.
Productivity : The common lifecycle profile of productivity follows that of US males with
numerical values taken from Fehr and Kindermann (2018). The idiosyncratic productivity process
is assumed to follow a log-normal process as
log(θt) = ρlog(θt−1) + εt, t > 1,
with ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε) and the initial state distributed as log(θ1) ∼ N(0, σ20). The parameterization
of this process follows Huggett (1996) with ρ = 0.96, σ2ε = 0.045, and σ
2
0 = 0.38. This process is
discretized following the method developed by Tauchen (1986) with 19 grid points. Finally, the
state space is rescaled to normalize the average gross annualised lifetime income in the pre-reform
economy to one.
Preferences: The risk preference parameter is set to σ = 2. I parameterize the discount factor
β such that the identity β(1 + r) = 1 holds, where the interest rate r is set to the average real
US interest rate since the 1960’s at r = 3.85% following World Bank (2018). This results in a
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value for the discount factor of β = 0.963.
Results
I will only discuss the quantitative results for the case where lifetime taxes are collected with
intermediate tax payments in each period. This is for two reasons: first, the collection proce-
dure without intermediate collection would change the timing of tax collections compared to the
baseline model with an annual tax system. No taxes would be collected during the course of the
working life with one large payment coming due before retirement. If there is a non-zero measure
of borrowing constrained households in the baseline model, this will lessen the impact of those
constraints and lead to welfare gains that, in my view, cannot be attributed to the change of the
tax base, but rather to that in the timing of collections. Second, a single large tax payment at
the end of the working life gives rise to several implementability concerns such as agents dying
prematurely, or leaving the country toward the end of the working life in order to escape their
tax burden. The case with intermediate collections is free from such concerns as workers are
’even’ with the tax authorities at the end of each period.
Contrary to the case of perfect foresight discussed in the previous section, such a reform will not
lead to welfare gains in a model with idiosyncratic risk. Given the above specification, a move
from an annual tax system to a tax on lifetime income will lead to a small welfare loss that is
equivalent to a decrease in average consumption of 0.16%8.
First, it is important to note that this welfare loss is not uniform, i.e. not everybody loses due
to this reform. Figure 2.2 shows the welfare gains of households by their ex-ante income types.
As can be seen in the figure, workers who start their lives with very low, or very high, incomes,
and hence expect to have fairly high volatility in their lifetime earnings, will gain through the
8All calculations assume a utilitarian welfare function with the weights on ex-ante types given by their popu-
lation weights.
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Figure 2.2: Welfare Gains Through the Reform
reform, while those that start their lives with closer to the median of the distribution lose welfare.
While the gain is considerable for low-income households, the overall welfare gain is still negative
due to the small weight of such households in the population9.
Several reasons for this drop in average welfare can be excluded on the basis of careful
modeling choices. First, as the reform is revenue neutral, average consumption does not decrease
due to the change in the tax system, as income is exogenous and the government collects the same
amount of taxes. Second, due to the way the intermediate collections have been defined, there is
no change in the timing of tax collections, either. This implies that any change in welfare must
come from a change in the abilities of households to smooth consumption over their lifecycle.
In order to investigate this further, figure 2.3 depicts the change in average consumption over
the lifecycle. It shows that, on average, households will consume less during the first part of their
lives and then increase consumption over the pre-reform level towards the end of their working
lives. This suggests that the change in the tax system will lead to larger expected volatility
due to uncertainty about the size of future tax payments. Households react to this increase in
volatility by accumulating assets which they then run down at a faster rate towards the end of
9If, however, one were to consider a Rawlsian welfare function that seeks to maximize the welfare of the ’least
well off’ member of the society, this reform would lead to overall welfare gains
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Figure 2.3: Change in Average Consumption over the Lifecycle
Average consumption at each age is calculated for both the pre- and post-reform steady state with the respective
distribution.
their working lives when their expectations over their ex-post tax burden have stabilized. Since
the life-cycle profile of earnings will lead to an upward sloping consumption profile even in the
pre-reform steady state, such a ’back-loading’ of consumption is detrimental to welfare.
2.4 Efficiency Considerations
2.4.1 Effective Marginal Tax Rates with Perfect Foresight
In addition to the classic argument based on equity considerations discussed in section 2.3.1,
Liebman (2002) introduced the possibility of efficiency gains through a transition to a lifetime
income tax. In this section, I will briefly discuss his argument, as it is instructive when considering
how to think about labour distortions under tax on lifetime income.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the basis for his argument, as it depicts the average standard deviation
of marginal tax rates faced by households of a given lifetime income over their lifecycle. Given
that income fluctuates significantly over the lifecycle, the average standard deviation of marginal
tax rates is consistently between 3 and 4%-points. Liebman (2002) remarks that, since the
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Figure 2.4: Spread of Marginal Tax Rates
Average standard deviation for each lifetime income level are calculated based on the simulation of 5 million
earnings histories from an AR(1) income process, and for each draw calculating the standard deviation of marginal
tax rates faced over the lifecycle.
deadweight loss of taxation rises with the square of the effective marginal tax rate rather than
linearly, it should be more efficient if one could eliminate this dispersion and instead have each
household face a single, constant marginal tax rate over the lifecycle.
Since the meaning of a ’marginal tax rate’ is not immediately clear in a setting in which taxes
are levied on lifetime- rather than annual income, I will at this point introduce the concept of an
effective marginal tax rate. Formally, the effective marginal tax rate is equivalent to the wedge
introduced into the labor-leisure decision through the tax system, and can be defined as
τeff = 1− MRS
MRT
, (2.2)
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution between labour and leisure, while MRT denotes
the marginal rate of transformation, in this case the gross wage.
Consider the following simple two period model, where agents once again draw their entire
history at the start of their lives. As we are now considering labour supply, I will assume that this
history consists of productivities, instead of incomes. Given a draw θ2 = {θ1, θ2}, the household,
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that now cares about leisure as well as consumption solves
max
c1,c2,y1,y2
u
(
c1, 1− y1
θ1
)
+ βu
(
c2, 1− y2
θ2
)
subject to
c1 = y1 − T (y1)− a2
c2 = y2 − T (y2) + (1 + r)a2
in the case of annual taxation, and
c1 = y1 − a2
c2 = y2 − (1 + (1 + r))Tˆ
(
1
1 + (1 + r)
((1 + r)y1 + y2)
)
+ (1 + r)a2
in the case of a lifetime tax.
Taking first-order conditions in the case of annual taxation yields the intra-temporal opti-
mality conditions
ul
uc
= (1− T ′(yt))θt.
Since the left hand side of this equation is exactly the marginal rate of substitution between
labour and leisure, we can substitute the above into the definition of the effective marginal tax
rate to yield
τeff = T
′(yt), t = 1, 2.
Thus, in the case of annual taxation, the effective marginal tax rate coincides with the ’usual’
definition of the marginal tax rate and differs across periods for those households whose income
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changes between period.
On the other hand, the intra-temporal optimality conditions for the case with lifetime income
taxation are given by
ul(c1, 1− l1)
uc(c1, 1− l1) =
[
1− uc(c2, 1− l2)
uc(c1, 1− l1) Tˆ
′(y¯)
]
θ1
ul(c2, 1− l2)
uc(c2, 1− l2) =
[
1− Tˆ ′(y¯)
]
θ2,
which will lead to an effective marginal tax rate of
τ1eff =
uc(c2, 1− l2)
uc(c1, 1− l1) Tˆ
′(y¯)
τ1eff = Tˆ
′(y¯).
Thus, even in a world with perfect foresight, effective marginal tax rates are not necessarily
equalized under a lifetime income tax schedule. If a household is borrowing constrained, then
the effective marginal tax rate is depressed in the first period, as the household cares more
about the contemporaneous consumption afforded by an extra unit of income than about the
consumption they will have to forgo in the next period to pay the taxes on this unit of income.
Thus, the constant marginal tax rate employed by Liebman (2002) is an upper bound for the
distortion induced by a lifetime tax schedule, implying that the reduction in deadweight loss from
a transition to such a lifetime tax calculated in that paper actually constitutes a lower bound on
the true reduction in deadweight loss.
However, the above result once again depends on the assumption that households have per-
fect foresight over their future productivity types (and hence their future earnings). If future
earnings are uncertain due to idiosyncratic risk, workers have to form expectations about their
eventual lifetime earnings, which will drive their effective marginal tax rate. Additionally, as I
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will demonstrate in the next section, insurance against bad earnings histories afforded by the
tax system will start to impact the effective marginal tax rate faced by households over their
lifecycle, in addition to the effect of borrowing constraints discussed above.
2.4.2 Effective Marginal Tax Rates with Idiosyncratic Risk
In order to analyse the properties of effective marginal tax rates under lifetime income taxation
in the presence of idiosyncratic risk, I will add a labour-leisure choice to the model introduced in
section 2.3.2. Similar to the analysis in that section, I will once again consider both a case with
intermediate tax collection as well as a case where all taxes are paid at the end of the working
life.
I now assume that households no longer draw their income directly, but rather draw a pro-
ductivity type θ. Again, they draw their initial type θ1 at the start of their lives, and then make
a new draw each period from a distribution F (θt|θt−1). Upon observing their type in period t,
households solve the following problem
Vt(at, y¯t−1, θt) = max
ct,at+1,yt
u
(
ct,
yt
θt
)
+ ψt+1βEt [Vt+1 (at+1, y¯t, θt+1)] (2.3)
subject to the budget constraints
ct + at+1 ≤ y −T(yt) + (1 + r)at, t < R (2.4)
ct + at+1 ≤ (1 + r)at, t ≥ R (2.5)
the borrowing constraint a′ ≥ 0, the initial conditions a1 = y¯0 = 0, as well as the law of motion
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for the annualised lifetime income
y¯t =
(1 + r)
∑t−1
s=1(1 + r)
t−1−sy¯t−1 + yt∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−s . (2.6)
Finally, the tax payment T(yt) due after history yt depends on the way that taxes are collected.
Without intermediate collection, we will have
T(yt) =

0 , t < R− 1
∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−sTˆt(y¯t) , t = R− 1,
(2.7)
while in the case with intermediate collection we have
T(yt) =

Tˆt(y¯t) , t = 1
∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−sTˆt(y¯t)− (1 + r)
∑t−1
s=1(1 + r)
t−1−sTˆt−1(y¯t−1) , t > 1.
(2.8)
Since in both cases, tax payments depend only on the annualised lifetime income instead of the
entire history of earnings, we can simplify the notation and write T(yt) = Tt(y¯t).
The households’ first order conditions during working periods are given by
uc(ct, lt) ≥ β(1 + r)E [uc(ct+1, lt+1)] (2.9)
ul(ct, lt)
1
θ
+ uc(ct, lt)(1−T′t(y¯t)) + βE
[
∂Vt+1 (at+1, y¯t, θt+1)
∂y¯t
∂y¯t
∂yt
]
= 0. (2.10)
Note that, since workers face no mortality risk during their working lives, i.e. we have ψt+1 =
0, t < R, I have dropped this parameter for notational convenience.
Considering the first oder condition for labour supply, we can see that taxes now have an
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instantaneous, as well as a dynamic impact on the labour supply decision. First, if taxes are col-
lected in period t, workers take into account the current marginal tax rate T′t(y¯T ). Additionally,
since income earned today will impact the annualised lifetime income state, there will be a dy-
namic effect through the envelope condition ∂Vt+1(at+1,y¯t,θt+1)∂y¯t , that describes how a household’s
continuation value will change when starting the next period with slightly more past annualised
lifetime income.
In order to simplify the discussion, I will consider the cases with and without intermediate tax
payments separately, starting with the case without intermediate collections. In this case, since
taxes are only collected in the final period, we can immediately see that the above-mentioned
effects of taxes on labour supply are exclusive to each other. In any non-final working period,
there will be no instantaneous effect of taxation, i.e. T′t(y¯t) = 0, while in the final working period
we will have ∂Vt+1(at+1,y¯t,θt+1)∂y¯t = 0, since taxes do not matter during retirement.
Thus, in the final working period, the first order condition is given by
ul(ct, lt)
1
θ
+ uc(ct, lt)(1−T′t(y¯t)) = 0
↔ ul(ct, lt)1
θ
+ uc(ct, lt)
(
1−
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−sTˆ ′(y¯t)
∂y¯t
∂yt
)
= 0
↔ ul(ct, lt)1
θ
+ uc(ct, lt)
(
1− Tˆ ′(y¯t)
)
= 0,
where the first step employs equation (2.7), while the second follows from (2.6).
Turning to non-final working periods t < R − 1, we will need to consider the envelope
condition. For any t < R− 2, we will have
∂Vt+1 (at+1, y¯t, θt+1)
∂y¯t
= βE
[
∂Vt+2 (at+2, y¯t+1, θt+2)
∂y¯t+1
∂y¯t+1
∂y¯t
]
,
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which can then be ’rolled forward’ until the last working period to give
∂Vt+1 (at+1, y¯t, θt+1)
∂y¯t
= βR−1−(t+1)E
[
∂VR−1 (aR−1, y¯R−2, θR−1)
∂y¯R−2
∂y¯R−2
∂y¯t
]
.
Since taxes come due in the last working period and depend not only on current, but also on
past income, the envelope will be non-trivial in this case. Specifically, we have
∂VR−1 (aR−1, y¯R−2, θR−1)
∂y¯R−2
= −uc(cR−1, lR−1)T′R−1(y¯R−1)
∂y¯R−1
∂y¯R−2
,
implying
∂Vt+1 (at+1, y¯t, θt+1)
∂y¯t
= −βR−1−(t+1)E
[
uc(cR−1, lR−1)T′R−1(y¯R−1)
∂y¯R−1
∂y¯t
]
.
Finally, by repeatedly employing equation (2.6) as well as (2.7), we get the final expression for
the envelope condition as
∂Vt+1 (at+1, y¯t, θt+1)
∂y¯t
= −(1 + r)R−1−tβR−1−(t+1)E
[
uc(cR−1, lR−1)Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
= (1 + r)E
[
uc(cR−1, lR−1)Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
,
(2.11)
where the second step makes use of the standard assumption β(1 + r) = 1.
Substituting the envelope into the first order condition, we get
ul(ct, lt)
1
θ
+ uc(ct, lt)−E
[
uc(cR−1, lR−1)Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
= 0. (2.12)
Thus, in non-final working periods, labour supply is impacted not by the current marginal tax
rate, but rather by the expected marginal tax rate at the end of the working life, weighted with
the marginal utility of consumption in the last working period.
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Having derived the first order conditions for the household, we can now substitute all of our
preliminary results into the definition of the effective tax rate to get
τ teff = 1−
MRS
MRT
= 1− ul
ucθ
= E
[
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
.
(2.13)
Thus, for the case without intermediate collections, the effective marginal tax rate faced by
households is given by the marginal utility weighted expected marginal tax rate at the end of
the working life.
In order to better understand this object, it is worthwhile to consider how lifetime taxation
differs from annual taxation, and how this will impact the effective marginal tax rate. First,
since workers do not enjoy perfect foresight in a world with idiosyncratic risk, they will have to
form expectations about their ex-post marginal tax rate, which they will update in each period
of their working lives as new information arrives. Hence, contrary to Liebman (2002), households
in a heterogeneous agent model will not face constant marginal tax rates over their lives. Given
that, however, they receive successively more information in each period, one should suspect
that effective tax rates might be smoothed significantly over the lifecycle compared with annual
taxation. Second, workers will now face gaps between the time that income is earned, and when
tax on that income comes due. This disparity will become important if households value income
differently at different times of their lifecycle. A household that is borrowing constrained, or
expects to be borrowing constrained at some point between the current period and the period
in which taxes are due, will value income more today than at the point when taxes are due.
This will, in effect, cause them to discount future tax payments more strongly, lowering the
effective marginal tax rate. Finally, lifetime taxes are able to provide some level of insurance
that annual taxes cannot. Specifically, they insure households against the risk of receiving a
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history of bad shocks. Thus, we should expect this to be reflected in the effective marginal tax
rates, as households may care less about high marginal tax rates in states that follow a good
earnings history compared to those that follow a poor earnings history.
Returning to the formulation of the effective marginal tax rate, we can in fact find all these
three elements. To make this more clear, I will decompose the effective tax rate into three
components, each corresponding to one of the above mentioned effects.
Using an identity from probability theory, namely E [A ·B] = E [A]E [B] + Cov(A,B), we
can write the effective marginal tax rate as
τ teff = E
[
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
= E
[
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
]
·E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
+ Cov
(
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
, Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
)
= E
[
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
]
·E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
−E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
+E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
+ Cov
(
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
, Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
)
= E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
−E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
]
E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
+ Cov
(
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
, Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
)
.
The first term in this decomposition denotes the effect of the expected marginal tax rate at
the end of the working life. As workers receive more information about their lifetime income,
this term will update over the lifecycle and grow ever closer to the actual ex-post marginal tax
rate. The second term captures the effect of borrowing constraints. A worker who currently
is, or expects to be borrowing constrained in the future will have a higher marginal utility of
consumption in the current period compared to the final working period. Because of this, she
cares more about income today and discounts the expected ex-post marginal tax rate accordingly.
Finally, the last term captures the effect of the insurance over income histories. If consumption
and marginal tax rates are positively correlated, as should be expected when the tax system is
progressive, this term will be negative, and hence lower the effective tax rate.
Proposition 6 summarises the results so far
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Proposition 6 In a lifecycle model with idiosyncratic risk and lifetime income taxation without
tax collection in intermediate periods, the effective tax rate faced by households is given by
τ teff = E
[
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
,
and can be decomposed into three components as
τ teff = E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected ex-post rate
−E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
]
E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Borrowing constraints
+Cov
(
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
, Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insurance component
.
Next, I will turn to the somewhat more involved case of intermediate tax collections. In this
case, income earned in the current period will not only affect the tax payment due in the final
period, but also in all intermediate periods. Hence, we can no longer claim that the instantaneous
effect of taxation, and the envelope condition will be mutually exclusive as in the previous case.
Instead, consider the first order condition in period t
ul(ct, lt)
1
θ
+ uc(ct, lt)
(
1−T′t(y¯t)
∂y¯t
∂yt
)
+ βE
[
∂Vt+1 (at+1, y¯t, θt+1)
∂y¯t
∂y¯t
∂yt
]
= 0.
By the definitions (2.8) and (2.6), we will have
T
′
t(y¯t)
∂y¯t
∂yt
= Tˆ ′(y¯t),
i.e. the instantaneous marginal tax rate. Additionally, we can no longer ’roll forward’ the
envelope condition as in the previous case, since past average income now directly impacts the
workers budget constraint in each period through the tax rebate as well as the taxes due in that
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period. Specifically, we have
∂Vt+1 (at+1, y¯t, θt+1)
∂y¯t
= uc(ct+1, lt+1)
(
t+1∑
s=1
(1 + r)t+1−sTˆ ′(y¯t+1)
∂y¯t+1
∂y¯t
− (1 + r)
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−sTˆ ′(y¯t)
)
+ βE
[
∂Vt+2 (at+2, y¯t+1, θt+2)
∂y¯t+1
∂y¯t+1
∂y¯t
]
= uc(ct+1, lt+1)(1 + r)
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−s
(
Tˆ ′(y¯t+1)− Tˆ ′(y¯t)
)
+
∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−s∑t+1
s=1(1 + r)
t+1−sE
[
∂Vt+2 (at+2, y¯t+1, θt+2)
∂y¯t+1
]
.
Iterating this equation forward one period and collecting terms, we get
∂Vt+1 (at+1, y¯t, θt+1)
∂y¯t
= −(1 + r)
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−sTˆ ′(y¯t)uc(ct+1, lt+1)
+ (1 + r)
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−sTˆ ′(y¯t+1)E [uc(ct+1, lt+1)− uc(ct+2, lt+2)]
+ (1 + r)
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−sE
[
Tˆ ′(y¯t+2)uc(ct+2, lt+2)
]
+
∑t
s=1(1 + r)
t−s∑t+2
s=1(1 + r)
t+2−sE
[
∂Vt+3 (at+3, y¯t+2, θt+3)
∂y¯t+2
]
.
Once again, we know that the envelope in period R will be zero, as annualised lifetime income
does not enter the household problem during retirement. Hence, we can repeatedly substitute
the above into itself to get the following expression for the envelope condition
∂Vt+1 (at+1, y¯t, θt+1)
∂y¯t
= −(1 + r)
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−sTˆ ′(y¯t)uc(ct+1, lt+1)
+ (1 + r)
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−s
R−2∑
q=t+1
E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯q) (uc(cq, lq)− uc(cq+1, lq+1))
]
+ (1 + r)
t∑
s=1
(1 + r)t−sE
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)uc(cR−1, lR−1)
]
By substituting the above into the first order condition and once more employing (2.6), we finally
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get
ul(ct, lt)
1
θ
+ uc(ct, lt)−
R−2∑
q=t
Et
[
Tˆ ′(y¯q) (uc(cq, lq)− uc(cq+1, lq+1))
]
−E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)uc(cR−1, lR−1)
]
= 0.
(2.14)
Compared to the corresponding first order condition in the case without intermediate tax pay-
ments, we can immediately see that now it is not only the marginal utility weighted expected
ex-post marginal tax rate that matters for labour supply decisions, but rather all intermediate
rates as well. Specifically, each intermediate rate will matter in the case that a household expects
to value income differently at the time that the tax is paid and that the rebate is granted in the
following period.
Once again employing the definition of the effective marginal tax rate, we can immediately
write it as
τ teff =
R−2∑
q=t
E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯q)
uc(cq, lq)− uc(cq+1, lq+1)
uc(ct, lt)
]
+E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
]
While the second term is identical to the case without intermediate collections, the first term
is novel. This term captures the aforementioned intermediate tax rates that become relevant
precisely whenever a household values income more in the current than in the next period, i.e.
whenever it is borrowing constrained. Hence, we will have an additional component in this case
that captures intermediate borrowing constraints and will increase the effective marginal tax
rate. For a household that expects to never be borrowing constrained, this term will be zero.
Additionally, since the tax function is non-linear, households will care more about borrowing
constraints in states where they pay a high marginal tax compared to those where they pay
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low marginal taxes. This will lead to an additional intermediate insurance component, where
households are not insured against bad income histories, but rather against becoming borrowing
constrained in the future.
Applying the same technique as in the previous proposition, we arrive at the final result of
this section
Proposition 7 In a lifecycle model with idiosyncratic risk and lifetime income taxation with tax
collection in intermediate periods, the effective tax rate faced by households is given by
τ teff =
R−2∑
q=t
E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯q)
uc(cq, lq)− uc(cq+1, lq+1)
uc(ct, lt)
]
+E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
]
,
and can be decomposed into five components as
τ teff = E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected ex-post rate
−E
[
uc(ct, lt)− uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
]
E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Borrowing constraints
+Cov
(
uc(cR−1, lR−1)
uc(ct, lt)
, Tˆ ′(y¯R−1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insurance component
+
R−2∑
q=t
E
[
Tˆ ′(y¯q)
] [uc(cq , lq)− uc(cq+1, lq+1)
uc(ct, lt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intermediate borrowing constraints
+
R−2∑
q=t
Cov
(
uc(cq , lq)− uc(cq+1, lq+1)
uc(ct, lt)
, Tˆ ′(y¯q)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intermediate Insurance
.
Having derived, as well as decomposed, the effective marginal tax rates that would be induced
by a tax on lifetime income, the next section will concern itself with the quantitative analysis of
this effective marginal tax rate and its components.
2.4.3 Approximating Effective Tax Rates
This section will present a quantitative approximation of the effective marginal tax rates un-
der lifetime taxation with intermediate collections, thereby quantifying the results developed in
proposition 7. In order to avoid having to solve the full model with endogenous labour supply
developed in section 2.4.2, I will use the model with exogenous income from section 2.3.2 as an
’auxiliary model’. Specifically, I will take the solution to this model and employ it to calculate
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the expectations and covariances in proposition 710.
The derivative of the lifetime tax function Tˆ with respect to lifetime income is calculated
numerically after deriving this function from the baseline model with annual taxes by averaging
the NPV of taxes paid by all agents within a certain income group.
Figure 2.5 shows the average effective marginal tax rate for each age group in the case of
annual and lifetime income taxation, as well as the decomposition of the effective tax rate in the
case of annual income taxation.
As can be seen from the figure, the overall size of the effective tax rate in the case of lifetime
taxation in driven by workers’ expectations about their ex-post marginal tax rate on lifetime
income. Surprisingly, this expectation lies above the average effective tax rate of the pre-reform
state in every period, suggesting that there exists a non-trivial relationship between the functions
T (y) and Tˆ (y¯) that should be explored more closely in future work. Driven by this, the average
effective marginal tax rate in the post-reform state lies above that of the pre-reform state in
every age group.
Turning to the decomposition, we find that the four components capturing the effects of bor-
rowing constraints and insurance matter only during the first part of the working life. Young
workers in this model are very likely to be borrowing constrained, leading to a significant re-
duction in the effective tax rate in the first years of labour market activity. This is because
a borrowing constrained worker cares less about taxes they will have to pay at some point in
the future and more about boosting his current consumption through increased labour earnings.
At the same time, this is somewhat counteracted by the effect of intermediate borrowing con-
straints. While taxes paid in period t will be rebated to the worker in period t + 1, this only
removes the effect of intermediate collection for those workers who are not currently borrowing
10This approximation is necessary as the effective marginal tax rate is not always well-defined outside of equi-
librium, making the solution of the full model difficult. I aim to include the results of the model with endogenous
labour supply in future versions of this paper.
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constrained. Since, however, the marginal taxes on lifetime income are lower during the first part
of the earnings life, borrowing constraints have a negative net effect on the effective marginal
tax rate.
Turning to the effect of the two insurance components we find that they both reduce the
effective marginal tax rate during the first half of the working life. The first, and quantitatively
more significant, stems from the fact that workers expect to face low ex-post marginal tax rates
on their lifetime income in states where their consumption is low (and correspondingly their
marginal utility of consumption is large). Thus, when forming expectations over their ex-post
marginal tax rate they weigh these not evenly, but rather give larger weight to low tax states
and lower weight to those states in which both taxes and consumption are high, reducing their
effective marginal rate below the unconditional expectation of the ex-post rate.
Finally, there is a small intermediate insurance component that captures the effect that agents
are more likely to be borrowing constrained in states in which they are relatively poor, and are
consequently facing a lower tax on their current lifetime income.
Both of these insurance effects disappear over the course of the working life. The former
goes to zero as workers’ expectations about their ex-post marginal rates as well as their ex-post
consumption stabilize when more and more uncertainty is resolved. The latter goes to zero
simply because agents are less and less likely to be borrowing constrained as they grow older.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I explore the equity- as well as efficiency considerations of lifetime income taxation
in a heterogeneous agent model with idiosyncratic risk.
I demonstrate that the classical argument for equity gains of lifetime income taxation relies on
the particular structure of perfect foresight models employed to analyse such reforms previously.
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Figure 2.5: Average Effective Tax Rates over the Lifecycle
The average effective marginal tax rate at each age is calculated for both the pre- and post-reform steady state
with the respective distribution.
As such an argument cannot be made in a model with idiosyncratic risk, answering this question
will necessitate quantitative analysis. To this end, I build a lifecycle model with idiosyncratic
risk. I parameterize this model to reflect key aspects of the US economy and show that a move
from annual to lifetime taxation would lead to a small welfare loss that is equivalent to 0.16% of
average consumption. This loss is mainly due to increased savings by workers in order to insure
against possibly large tax burdens in the future. This leads to ’back-loading’ of consumption
which is detrimental to welfare.
Turning to efficiency considerations, I demonstrate that the ’constant marginal tax rate’
result is only valid in the absence of borrowing constraints. If borrowing constraints are present,
the effective marginal tax rate is not constant over the lifecycle even in a model with perfect
foresight. Rather, in periods where households are borrowing constrained, the marginal tax rate
is depressed. I then derive a formula for the effective marginal tax rate induced by a lifetime
income tax in a heterogeneous agent model with idiosyncratic risk and show that it can be
separated into the expected ex-post marginal tax rate, the effects of borrowing constraints, and
96 CHAPTER 2. LIFETIME TAXATION IN A HETEROGENOUS AGENT FRAMEWORK
the effects of insurance against lifetime income risks.
I then approximate the effective marginal tax rate under lifetime taxation and demonstrate
that the effects of insurance and borrowing constraints are quantitatively important, leading, in
aggregate, to a depression of the effective marginal tax rate below the expected ex-post rate.
Additionally, preliminary calculations demonstrate that the average effective marginal tax rate
under a lifetime income tax will be above that of an annual income tax which is in contrast to
the results of the previous literature.
As I demonstrate, the conclusions drawn about the desirability of lifetime income taxation in
a perfect foresight world do not generalize to a mode with idiosyncratic risk. I show that there
is evidence that such a reform may be undesirable for both equity and efficiency reasons. Future
research should focus on gaining a better understanding of the relationship between marginal
taxes under annual and lifetime taxation in order to better understand why such a reform may
be undesirable on efficiency grounds.
Chapter 3
Bank Funding Structure and Risk
Taking
joint with M. Petricek, C. Garcia Galindo, and A. Ferrrari
3.1 Introduction
There are two established, opposing theoretical results about the effect of leverage on risk taking
by banks. First, due to limited liability, expected returns on equity investment increase with an
increased riskiness of the portfolio. As a bank’s equity holders are protected from the left tail
of the returns to assets distribution by limited liability, they have an incentive to increase the
variance of the distribution by taking on more risk. On the other hand, callable demand deposits
constitute a substantial part of bank debt. On average, almost 20 percent of these are above the
amount insured by the Federal deposit insurance corporation. This provides depositors with a
strong incentive to monitor as well as with tools to punish excessive risk taking.
There is inconclusive empirical evidence on which of the two effects prevails. Some authors
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such as Koudstaal and van Wijnbergen (2012) find that higher leverage leads to less risk taking,
while other such as Acosta Smith et al. (2017) find that an increase in capital requirements
leads to a decrease in risk taking. Finally, there are some authors such as Jacques and Nigro
(1997) that find no effect at all. As we argue below, the results in all these papers are, however,
influenced by endogeneity issues. Our aim in this paper is then to estimate the causal effect of
leverage on risk taking behaviour of banks. In doing so we add to the literature by proposing a
novel approach to addressing endogeneity in this setting.
We identify two sources of endogeneity and propose a method to address them. First, an
increase in leverage may incentivise banks to pursue riskier investment, but at the same time the
demand and supply of deposits, which drive a bank’s leverage given equity, can also be affected by
a bank’s risk taking, giving rise to reverse causality. Such an effect may arise if a bank becomes
known for making risky investment choices and is consequently avoided by depositors. Second,
shocks, observable or non-observable, common to both assets and liabilities of a bank, if omitted,
can cause a bias in the estimate of the effect of leverage on risk taking. This, in particular, is an
issue that will arise whenever one measures risk as realised risk in the portfolio, as is common in
the previous literature.
We conduct our empirical analysis by using instrumental variable estimation. We first address
the issue of reverse causality by making use of bank office level data on deposits for US banks
and geographically granular unemployment data. We argue that local unemployment rates are
exogenous to the risk taking of a bank as a whole, and construct an instrument based on bank’s
exposure to deposit supply shocks caused by changes in local unemployment rates, to use in our
final regression of leverage on risk. However, as is often the case in the empirical literature, if risk
taking is approximated by using a risk measure of existing portfolios, the issue of omitted shocks,
which may be common to both assets and liabilities, remains. To address this, we construct a
measure of risk taking based solely on newly issued mortgage loans, by considering the universe
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of mortgage loan applications from 1999 to 2016. We argue that, while the existing portfolio of
a bank can be affected by geographical area specific shocks which affect deposits and leverage
at the same time, newly issued loans are chosen by banks after the shocks have realized. Hence,
the riskiness of newly issued loans is a choice by the bank, unaffected by local area shocks.
Our results confirm that limited liability induces banks to take on more risk after an exogenous
increase in leverage, with more leveraged banks being significantly more likely to issue risky
mortgage loans. We find that decreasing a bank’s leverage ratio by 1 percentage point (which
corresponds to an increase in leverage), will lead to this bank originating a loan of ’average’ risk
with a 3.8% higher probability. In a second estimation we find that this translates into a 1%
increase in the predicted median probability of default of loans issued by this bank.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 3.2 provides a review of the
relevant literature, sections 3.3 explains the methodology and the data. Section 3.4 presents the
results, while section 3.5 discusses their robustness with respect to the measure of risk taking.
Finally, section 3.6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the findings.
3.2 Literature Review
There are several theoretical papers on how banks’ funding structure should impact their risk
taking. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that for a firm the decision to take on debt is equivalent
to buying a call option from its creditors. When the debt is due, they can either choose to redeem
the bond (buy back the firm, so to speak) or not to. Since the value of such an option is increasing
in volatility (see for example Black and Scholes (1973)), firms have an interest to take on higher
amount of risk than without debt financing. On the other hand, as Laeven and Levine (2009)
point out, requiring banks to hold more capital may not necessarily reduce these incentives if
this capital is raised by issuing equity to new shareholders. Simply adding more shareholders
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with the same incentives may not actually alleviate the issue. Instead, shareholders may decide
to make up for the higher cost of capital by taking on even more risky projects in the spirit of
Koehn and Santomero (1980). Finally, Diamond and Rajan (2001) show that demand deposits
can have a disciplining effect on banks. Our paper contributes to the literature by providing a
well-identified answer about the causal effect of leverage on risk taking.
In the empirical literature, there are two ways that previous work has addressed the question
of how leverage impacts bank risk taking. The first strain of papers seeks to provide an answer
through a direct regression of a measure of leverage on some measure of risk. Altunbas et al.
(2007) aim to identify the relationship between leverage and risk by means of a seemingly un-
related regression design that relates changes in capital and risk. They use loan-loss provisions
as a proxy for the risk taken on by the bank and find that in their whole sample, banks with
a higher equity to asset ratio will take on more risk, while the relationship is negative for the
most efficient banks in the sample. Jacques and Nigro (1997) employ an approach that uses a
regulatory pressure variable, a measure of how far a bank’s equity holdings are from the regula-
tory threshold, to identify the effect of leverage on risk, but can not refute the null hypothesis
that leverage has no effect on risk taking. Koudstaal and van Wijnbergen (2012) aim to identify
the effect of leverage on risk by regressing the standard deviation of returns on assets on lagged
leverage while controlling for market volatility. They find that higher leverage leads to less risk
taking, but that this result is entirely driven by low leverage banks. Highly leveraged banks,
they find, do not react to changes in leverage. Similarly to the above paper, Shrieves and Dahl
(1992) find that banks take on more risk when there is a positive shock to capital by using a
simultaneous regression framework. As we will argue in our methodological section below, all
these papers have shortcomings in two ways: first, they fail to provide a convincing identification
in the sense that leverage cannot be seen as exogenous in any of the above models. Second, as
all the papers employ some measure of portfolio risk, they consider a rather noisy measure of
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risk taking which is also impacted by market conditions, which may in turn be impacting banks
leverage decisions.
The second strain of papers in the literature attempts to provide exogenous variation to
leverage by evaluating the effect of policies that impact banks ability to leverage out. Laeven
and Levine (2009) find that requiring banks with an owner that holds a significant voting share to
hold more capital has the effect of reducing risk taking, while the opposite is true for widely held
banks. Acosta Smith et al. (2017) find that the introduction of the leverage ratio requirements
in the Basel III framework did cause banks to increase their capital holdings and reduce their
risk taking. Finally, Ashraf et al. (2016) show that the introduction of risk weighted capital
standards led to a reduction of bank portfolio risk in Pakistan. We add to the empirical literature
by providing clean identification of the causal effect of leverage on risk taking, both by adding
a new instrument for leverage and by using a measure of risk taking (a banks decision to issue
certain loans) that is much less likely to be subject to outside influences and previous choices
than the portfolio based measure currently used in the literature. While these papers suffer from
the endogeneity associated with leverage to a smaller degree, we believe that our identification
is superior as we do not need to rely on the assumption that banks did not react to news or
rumors of potential policy changes prior to the implementation of the reform. Additionally, all of
these papers rely once more on portfolio based measures of risk, while the present work employs
a much more direct measure of risk taking.
In parallel work to this, Ohlrogge (2017) uses an approach that is similar to the one taken in
this paper and comes to results that confirm our analysis.
Methodologically, our paper is related to a paper by Bartik (1993) that employs local industry
shares to identify the impact of labour supply on wages. This approach has been recently
formalized and discussed by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017).
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3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Overview
In this section we explain the endogeneity issues that plague the analysis of leverage and risk
taking, as well as our methodology to tackle them. Before diving deeper into those issues, some
definitions will prove useful in the following discussion. First, we will use the term risk taking
(behaviour) as an act of making new investments (issuing new loans) with different degree of
riskiness attached to them. This is the subject of our analysis. It is important to distinguish it
from the term riskiness of the portfolio, which is defined by the riskiness attached to loans
which have been issued in the past. Variation in riskiness of the portfolio can be caused by
both risk taking behaviour and by current and past shocks absorbed by the portfolio. Although
the riskiness of the portfolio is often used to proxy risk taking behaviour in the literature, the
distinction will be important in understanding the issue of endogeneity and our identification.
Most commonly, the literature defines an increase in leverage as an increase in debt financing
relative to equity financing by a bank. Basel III however defines a leverage ratio as core equity
relative to total assets. For the purpose of easy application to the most recent regulation, we use
the latter as a measure of leverage in our econometric analysis. Thus, an increase in leverage
due to an increase in debt financing corresponds to a decrease in the leverage ratio.
We identify two sources of endogeneity which prevent a causal interpretation of a simple
regression of leverage on some commonly used measure of riskiness of the portfolio.
• Simultaneity/reverse causality: For a given level of equity, more deposits may incentivise
banks to undertake riskier investments, but the demand and supply of deposits are also
affected by the riskiness of the portfolio and a bank’s risk taking behavior.
• Omitted shocks common to the portfolio and the deposits.
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To tackle the first source of endogeneity we build an instrument for leverage that is exogenous
to a bank’s risk choices. To this end, we use data on deposits at the office level provided by the
FDIC. This detailed geographical information on deposits enables us to compute bank exposure
to local unemployment variation, which we use as an instrument providing us with variation in
leverage exogenous to bank behaviour. This measure, however, can still be endogenous if it relies
on the existing portfolio. If some exogenous shocks to economic activity occur, they are likely
to not only affect deposits (and leverage) through unemployment but also through the riskiness
of the existing portfolio. To tackle this issue, we construct a measure of risk taking based on the
new issuance of mortgage loans. We argue that while riskiness of the portfolio may be affected
by some shocks which are common to both deposits and assets, the riskiness of new issuances
are a choice for banks.
Following the procedure described above, we conduct our empirical analysis by, first, con-
structing an instrument to assure variation in leverage that is independent of bank risk taking
and constructing a measure of risk taking based on newly issued mortgage loans, which is inde-
pendent of local area shocks. We then regress our instrumented leverage ratio on the riskiness
of new issuances in order to estimate the causal effect of leverage on bank risk taking. The
methodology is explained in more detail after a discussion of the data employed.
3.3.2 Data
There are four main sources of data that we use in the analysis. The bank-office level deposit
data from the FDIC, and the local unemployment data from the Bureau of Labour Statistics are
used in constructing the instruments. We use the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data on the
universe of mortgage applications from the FFIEC to construct a measure of risk taking. Finally,
we add balance sheet data from the FDIC to calculate the leverage ratio in the IV estimation of
the effect of leverage on risk taking.
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Summary of deposits (FDIC)
Summary of deposits data is annual data on the level of deposits at the bank office level. For
every office, for every bank operating in the US and insured by the FDIC, the amount of deposits
as of June 31st is reported. Along with the deposit level, the data contains detailed geographic
and demographic information for every office as well as an identifier for the owning bank. This
identifier is then used to merge this data with balance sheet data also provided by the FDIC.
For the purpose of our analysis, the data for every bank is collapsed at a relevant geographical
area level. We will be using the Core Based Statistical Areas. A Core Based Statistical Area
(CBSA) consists of one or more counties (or equivalents) anchored by an urban center of at
least 10,000 people plus adjacent counties that are socioeconomically tied to the urban center
by commuting. Not all counties are a part of a CBSA. Around 10% of all observations come
from counties which are not part of any CBSAs adding up to around 5% of all deposits. We
aggregate these counties at the state level into CBSA equivalents and brand them as rural state
areas. Figure 3.1 presents some descriptive statistics from the Summary of Deposits data. Two
features of the data are noteworthy. First, over our sample period of 1999 to 2015, there is a
significant consolidation in the banking market, with the number of banks decreasing by about
40%, while the number of offices per bank more than double. We take care that this development
does not impact our analysis by removing an office sold by bank i to bank j in year t from the
sample in years t and t− 1, so that the change in deposits between t− 1 and t for neither bank
i nor bank j is affected by the transfer of ownership of that office.
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Figure 3.1: Bank offices data
Local area unemployment statistics (BLS)
Local area unemployment statistics provide monthly data on unemployment at the county level.
Since the relevant geographical area in constructing the instruments is the CBSA, we aggregate
the statistics to the CBSA level at yearly frequency. Figure 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics
of unemployment rate of the CBSAs in the US within our sample period. This graph shows
that there is indeed significant heterogeneity between CBSAs, when it comes to unemployment,
providing variation to exploit when constructing our instrument. As we show later, this hetero-
geneity in unemployment rates will have heterogenous effects on banks, which are differentiated
by the geographic composition of their deposit holdings. Finally, the first stage regression of our
instrumental variable approach shows that this variation is strongly correlated with leverage at
the bank level.
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Figure 3.2: CBSA unemployment statistics
Home mortgage disclosure act data (FFIEC)
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) mandates that banks above a set threshold of assets
issue detailed reports on their mortgage applications, lending and purchases. The reporting is
done through the Loan Application Registries (LAR) and includes all mortgage loan applications
within a year. Moreover, the registries contain some characteristics of the applicant and potential
co-applicant (ethnicity, race, gender, income), as well as characteristics of the loan (amount, type,
purpose, rate spread for some, occupancy), the property (type, census tract, etc.), the census
tract in which the property is located (income relative to the MSA, minority population, number
of housing units, etc.), as well as the action taken by the bank (origination, denial and its reason,
sale to an institution like Freddie Mac).
Our construction of the measure of risk taking loosely follows DellAriccia et al. (2012) and
relies on the loan to income ratio. The loan to income ratio is computed as the total loan amount
in the application over the total gross annual income an institution relied upon in making the
credit decision1. To add to the methodology on a measure of risk taking we also use the data
1Gross annual income is not registered in HMDA due to four possible reasons: (i.) multi-family dwellings, (ii.)
income was not registered in the loan purchase documentation, (iii.) loans to bank employees, (iv.) loans to non
natural persons. These cases are excluded from the estimation as described in the methodology section
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on origination. We define origination as an application which has been accepted and then either
originated or refused by the applicant, a purchase of a loan, or a preapproved request. We define
a non-origination as an application denied by the bank or a denied prerequest. We ignore all
applications withdrawn by the applicants or applications closed for incompleteness.
The LAR data reports all applications, accepted or rejected. Table 3.1 provides the statistics
on the origination ratio between 2004 and 2012. The share of originated loan applications (see
column (1)) decreased from 74% in 2004 to 67% in 2007. In 2009, the origination ratio increased
sharply and then gradually increased to 80% in 2012. The sharp increase reflects the crisis, which
has decreased the demand for loans and forced the worse potential borrowers out of the market.
The remaining pool was of higher quality which increased banks willingness to lend to remaining
applicants.
Table 3.1: Reason for denial
Year
Origin.
ratio
Reason for denial
DtI
Empl.
hist.
Cred.
hist.
Coll. Dwnpay. Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2004 .744 .131 .010 .299 .113 .0154 .432
2005 .729 .122 .0111 .267 .122 .012 .466
2006 .715 .150 .0129 .284 .154 .017 .381
2007 .677 .173 .0123 .272 .193 .017 .332
2008 .681 .205 .0114 .265 .250 .018 .249
2009 .767 .227 .0129 .209 .310 .020 .220
2010 .776 .222 .0134 .202 .252 .021 .288
2011 .766 .214 .013 .223 .241 .021 .285
2012 .794 .213 .013 .233 .218 .024 .301
Table 3.1 also reports the shares of prevailing reasons for rejecting a loan. Insufficient collat-
eral (column (5), high debt-to-income (column (2)) and poor credit history (column (4)) explain
the bulk of the rejection decisions. The effect of the crisis is evident in the spike of the share of
rejections due to insufficient collateral in 2009 when house prices collapsed. We take into account
this crisis effect by including time fixed effects in our estimation of the risk measures.
On top of the loan application data, the LAR reports also the information about the loans
purchased by banks. Tables 3.2 provides the statistics about the characteristics of all applications,
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the accepted applications, the rejected applications and the purchased loans. The table shows
that accepted loans have, on average, a lower loan-to-income ratio than rejected loans.
Table 3.2: Loan-to-Income ratio
All Accepted Rejected Purchased
mean p50 mean p50 mean p50 mean p50
2004 2.274 2.083 2.227 2.103 2.408 2.000 2.502 2.390
2005 2.281 2.098 2.217 2.106 2.452 2.077 2.480 2.400
2006 2.188 1.974 2.109 1.951 2.385 2.038 2.322 2.233
2008 2.304 2.098 2.184 2.059 2.553 2.200 2.547 2.451
2008 2.433 2.209 2.311 2.174 2.687 2.300 2.735 2.607
2009 2.573 2.243 2.420 2.211 3.060 2.372 2.539 2.427
2010 2.430 2.139 2.309 2.115 2.846 2.244 2.673 2.540
2011 2.349 2.023 2.222 2.000 2.761 2.083 2.587 2.435
2012 2.384 2.054 2.291 2.051 2.735 2.065 2.573 2.409
Balance sheet data (FDIC)
To construct the leverage measure of banks, we use balance sheet data provided by the FDIC. The
data is available at quarterly level and includes income statements as well as several performance
ratios.
3.3.3 Exogenous Variation in Deposits: Two Instruments
The aim here is to construct an instrument to assure that the variation in leverage is independent
of risk taking. We do so in two ways: i) estimating shocks to local deposits caused by unem-
ployment changes which we then aggregate for each bank by computing the weighted average of
these local shocks; ii) or directly computing the weighted average of unemployment changes and
using this as an instrument for leverage.
To this end we use data on deposits at the bank-office level, administered by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Local Area Unemployment Statistics adminis-
tered by the Bureau of Labour Statistics. The first dataset contains yearly information on the
level of deposits for all offices of all banks insured by the FDIC, together with the demographic
information on the office and the bank which owns it. The second dataset provides monthly
unemployment figures at county level. The relevant geographical definition in our analysis is the
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Core Based Statistical Area.
The rationale behind these instruments for bank level deposit growth rates follows closely
Bartik (1993), whose approach has been extensively analysed in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017).
The standard idea behind this approach is that when one is interested in a parameter, say, the
elasticity of labour supply, using changes in wages and employment growth rates at local level, one
should be concerned with the endogeneity of local employment growth. To solve this issue, the
Bartik approach suggests to define an instrument as the local employment growth predicted by
interacting local industry employment shares with national industry employment growth rates.
In our setting we follow a similar logic but we apply it to a different level of granularity of
the data. Our potentially endogenous object is the deposit growth rate of banks. We therefore
build as an instrument the predicted change in deposits for a bank in a given period as the
interaction between the bank’s geographical area deposit share and the change in deposits in the
geographical area.
We do so in two different ways to avoid any further endogeneity concern or feedback loop be-
tween bank and area level deposit changes: i) we predict the change in deposits in a geographical
area in a given period based on the change of local unemployment in that period and use this
fitted value as our instrument; ii) we use the change in unemployment in the geographical area
directly (not using it to predict deposits) as the instrument.
Before discussing the two approaches in further detail, key differences between our strategy
and the standard Bartik instruments should be highlighted. As mentioned above, the literature
employs this approach to solve endogeneity problems. In contrast, we use the geographical
area shares as a mean of aggregation, not as a solution to endogeneity per se. We adopt as
instrumental variables for the leverage the “relevant” changes in local unemployment or deposit
supply, where “relevant” is to be read as weighted by geographical area deposit composition. The
adoption of this specific aggregation strategy serves two distinct purposes: first and foremost is
110 CHAPTER 3. BANK FUNDING STRUCTURE AND RISK TAKING
an appealing way of aggregating geographical area specific changes to the bank level; second it
eliminates any further endogeneity concerns.
The two approaches are formalized below.
Instrumenting deposits: In building the first instrument we regress the growth rate of
total deposits in a geographical area on the change in the local unemployment rate. We brand
the fitted values from this model at the geographical area level as shocks to deposit supply at
the geographical area level. For each bank in each year we then compute the exposure to this
variation in deposit supply as a weighted average of these shocks using the deposits each bank
holds in a particular area as weights. This implies the following procedure,
∆depi,t = α0 + γi + ηt + β∆unempi,t + i,t (3.1)
where ∆depi,t denotes the growth rate of deposits in a geographical area i in period t, γi
and ηt denote geographical area and time fixed effects, and ∆unempi,t denotes a change in
unemployment rate in geographical area i in period t. We call the fitted values from the model
above local deposit supply shocks. To compute the exposure of a particular bank in a particular
period to these shocks, which will serve as an instrument for leverage in our final estimation, we
compute the weighted average of these shocks for every bank, where then we use the deposit this
particular bank holds in different areas as weights. For bank b, operating in areas i = 1..I, this
implies:
∆ ˆdepb,t =
∑I
i=1 depb,i,t∆
ˆdepi,t∑I
i=1 depb,i,t
(3.2)
where depb,i,t denotes the deposits bank b holds in geographical area i in period t. We use
the measure ∆ ˆdepb,t as one of the possible instruments in the final estimation of the effect of
leverage on risk taking.
Table 3.3.3 presents the estimation results for equation 3.1. Results, as expected, prove a
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negative and highly significant effect of changes in unemployment on deposit growth rates at the
CBSA level. An increase in unemployment change in a CBSA by one percentage point decreases
the deposit growth rate in that area by 0.43 percentage points after controlling for the CBSA
and year fixed effects.
Table 3.3: First preliminary stage
(1)
∆ln(deposits)
∆ unemp -0.432∗∗∗∗
(0.117)
constant 0.0310∗∗∗∗
Time FE YES
CBSA FE YES
N 21450
R2 0.014
Standard errors in parentheses∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Direct local unemployment exposure: In building the alternative instrument we directly
estimate the exposure of each bank to changes in local unemployment rates, using, as before, the
deposits a bank holds as weights. For bank b, operating in areas i = 1..I, this exposure, ∆expb,t,
is given by:
∆expb,t =
∑I
i=1 depb,i,t∆unempi,t∑I
i=1 depb,i,t
(3.3)
where, as before, depb,i,t denotes the deposits bank j holds in geographical area i in period
t, and ∆unempi,t denotes a change in unemployment rate in geographical area i in period t.
We use ∆expb,t as the second instrument in the final estimation of the effect of leverage on risk
taking.
Figure 3.3 plots the mean of the bank level deposit supply shock, ˆdepj,t across time, and the
mean bank level exposure to unemployment, ∆expb,t. The figure reveals a sharp drop in deposit
supply coinciding with a spike in unemployment across the US.
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Figure 3.3: Mean bank exposure to local unemployment changes and deposit supply shocks
The two instruments exploit the same variation of changes in unemployment at the local
level. They are not numerically equivalent due to different specifications of the fixed effects. It
is also worth noting that the second instrument does not require any estimation since it is only
built through aggregation of local areas changes at the bank level. This is relevant because one
may be concerned that our first instrument may suffer from generated regressor problems. As
we will show later we obtain fairly similar results with the two instruments.
3.3.4 A Measure of Risk Taking
Remaining endogeneity
The procedure explained above describes constructing a measure of an exogenous change in
deposits and a measure of an exposure of banks to changes in local unemployment rates. Both
these measures are exogenous to risk taking, but not exogenous to a measure of riskiness of the
portfolio. To exemplify the issue, consider a shock to deposits in a certain area as estimated
in the previous section. Such a shock is likely to impact the income of depositors. It cannot,
however, be excluded to have impacted also the borrowers, private or corporate, in an area,
which may or may not have borrowed from the banks operating in that areas. Any measure of
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risk, which is based on the performance of the existing portfolio might be subject to this sort of
residual endogeneity.
New issuances of loans are not subject to this endogeneity concern since new issuances can
only be affected by the existing pool of potential loans. A geographical area shock can affect the
existing local pool of borrowers, while it does not affect the entire pool of potential borrowers.
New issuance of a loan is a choice for a bank and the riskiness of new issuances proxies risk
taking behaviour.
Creating a measure of risk taking
To this end we construct a measure of risk taking based on the issuances of new mortgage loans
based on the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) dataset, administered by the Federal Fi-
nancial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). It is a yearly dataset on the population of
mortgage applications to banks and other mortgage lenders with detailed information on the bor-
rower and loan characteristics. We take the riskiness of new mortgage lending as representative
of risk taking on the entire portfolio.
To construct a measure of risk taking behaviour by banks, we estimate the responsiveness of
loan issuance of each bank in each year to riskiness of the borrower and the loan. As a measure of
riskiness of the loan and the borrower we use the Loan-to-Income (LtI) ratio computed from the
HMDA dataset for every loan application. This follows loosely DellAriccia et al. (2012), where
LtI is used directly as a measure of risk in their analysis of lending standards. This methodology
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implies the following model2’3.
Origint,b,j = γ
0
t + γ
1
t,bLtIt,b,j + t,b,j (3.4)
whereOrigint,b,j denotes a binary loan origination variable which takes the valueOrigint,b,j =
1 if the application in period t to a bank b by a borrower j is accepted and loan is originated,
and takes the value Origint,b,j = 0 if the application is rejected and the loan is not originated.
γ0t captures the effect of the macroeconomic situation in period t for all banks, such as market
conditions and regulation, which may cause banks to have differing appetites for risk over time.
Finally, for every bank b in every period t we also obtain an estimate of the risk responsiveness
γˆ1t,b based on Loan-to-Income of all applicants j, which serves as a measure of risk taking behavior
by banks.
Figure 3.4 plots the risk measure for the banks included in the analysis over the years. The
distribution has a mean of −.0039622.
Figure 3.4: Responsiveness of origination to risk
2In order for γ0t to capture the macroeconomic conditions affecting the origination choices, we estimate the
model for all banks reporting to the HMDA dataset but only use the γ1t,i for banks included in the final regressions.
This implies including all the loan applications in the HMDA reporting in the estimations. The number varies
between 17 million applications and 40 million application which constrains us to estimating the model as a linear
probability model.
3This measure is joint work with Lpez-Quiles and Petricek (2018)
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3.3.5 IV Estimation of the Effect of Leverage on Risk Taking
In estimating the effect of leverage on risk taking we use the two instruments, explained in detail
above. As argued before the instrumented deposits and the direct measure of exposure to local
unemployment shocks are exogenous to risk taking. The instruments allow us to estimate two
effects: (i.) the effect of the two instruments on leverage, and (ii.)the effect of leverage on risk
taking.
More specifically we run the following two specifications:
γˆb,t = β0 + β1levb,t + ηb + δt + bt (3.5)
Where levbt is the endogenous variable, measured as the leverage ratio, ηb are bank fixed
effects and δt are time fixed effects which are included to control for different baseline risk pref-
erences of banks as well as a regulatory environment that may change over time. This equation
is then estimated by IV, where the endogenous variable levbt is instrumented with one of the two
instruments: either ∆ ˆdepbt or ∆expbt, depending on the model. It is also estimated by OLS, in
order to compare the coefficients of interest.
The results of the estimations are presented and discussed in the next section.
3.4 Results
Table 3.4 presents the results of the estimations for both instruments. Column (1) shows the
biased OLS estimate of regressing the risk taking measure on leverage ratio. Columns (2) and (3)
present the results using the deposit supply shocks as an instrument, while columns (4) and (5)
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present the results employing the exposure to changes in unemployment. Columns (2) and (4)
show the first stage of the two IV regressions, while Columns (3) and (5) show the second stage.
Both sets of results are consistent in terms of sign, so we will focus on the latter in explaining
them. All standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
First we find that the naive OLS approach severely underestimates the effect of leverage on
risk taking behaviour, the result being close to zero and statistically insignificant. This bias may
go some way towards explaining findings in the previous literature that leverage leads to less risk
taking, or has no effect (see for example Altunbas et al. (2007) and Jacques and Nigro (1997)).
All our results provide evidence for a positive effect of leverage on banks’ risk taking due to
limited liabilities4.
Table 3.4: Risk Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Risk Leverage Risk Leverage Risk
Leverage -0.0000902 -0.0118∗∗ -0.00564∗∗
(0.0000801) (0.00557) (0.00240)
IV ∆ Unemployment 5.462∗∗∗∗
(1.287)
IV ∆ Deposits -25.12∗∗∗∗
(2.817)
Non-Current Loans -0.163∗∗∗∗ -0.00255∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗∗ -0.00155∗∗∗∗
(0.00404) (0.000913) (0.00403) (0.000400)
Constant 0.0461∗∗∗∗ 9.776∗∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 10.35∗∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗∗
(0.000977) (0.0290) (0.0544) (0.0713) (0.0234)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 65811 65660 65660 65660 65660
R2 0.118 0.056 0.057
F (instr.excl.) 17.72 79.00
Standard errors in parentheses∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We also investigate the possibility of nonlinear effects of leverage on risk taking by running
our IV regression through 2SLS and interacting the predicted endogenous variable with dummy
4Since leverage is measured as leverage ratio (core capital over total average assets), a negative sign implies
that an increase in leverage (a decrease in leverage ratio) increases risk taking by banks
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variables denoting different deciles of the leverage distribution. We find no significant pattern in
the estimation and that most coefficient on these dummies are not statistically significant. The
takeaway of this analysis is that the effect of leverage in our data does not vary significantly
along the distribution of leverage.
Quantitatively our results state that a one point increase in the leverage ratio5 generates an
.0118 decrease in our risk taking measure. The mean of the risk measure in our data is .038,
which implies that a one point increase in the leverage ratio produces a 31% decrease risk taking
when compared to the average.
For a specific example, assume that two banks are identical except for their leverage ratios,
which differ by one percentage point. Assume that they receive the same application for a
mortgage loan with average Loan-to-Income. Our estimates suggest that this application has an
expected probability of being originated in the bank with the higher leverage (i.e. lower leverage
ratio) of γ0 + γiLTI whereas the expected probability of origination for the less leveraged bank
is γ0 +(γi− .0118)LTI. Evaluating these probabilities at the average of our estimates and at the
average loan-to-income we obtain that the more leveraged bank has a 3.1% higher probability of
originating the loan.
Note also that this wedge between the probabilities of acceptance increases with the loan-
to-income ratio. Meaning that the higher the loan-to-income of the applicant the larger the
difference in expected acceptance probabilities between the more and less leveraged bank.
Our results have policy relevant implications in terms of the aggregate level of risk in the
banking system. The estimations show that more levered banks are more likely to take on riskier
projects due to limited liability incentives which implies that curbing leverage has the added
5Leverage ratio is defined as core capital divided by assets. Thus an increase in the leverage ratio is associated
with a decrease in bank leverage.
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benefit of reducing banks’ risk taking, thereby producing a more resilient banking system.
3.5 Robustness
In our main analysis we use as the outcome a risk measure based directly on banks’ lending
decisions. The novelty of this measure lies in the fact that it captures the responsiveness of
origination behaviour to a proxy of risk, namely the loan to income ratio. One could however
be concerned that LtI being our only proxy for risk in our estimation the γ parameter may
be capturing correlations of LtI with unobserved loan characteristics. In order to address this
potential problem redo the above analysis with a second measure for bank risk taking.
We resort to a further data source (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) to obtain mort-
gage delinquency rates at the county level. This data covers 470 counties for the period 2009-2015.
The sample is representative and covers approximately 85% of all mortgage lending in the HMDA
data. We use the 90 days delinquency rate for closed-end, 1-4 family residential mortgages. The
full list of variables and sources is in Table 3.1 in the Appendix.
The idea of this procedure is that we can observe the delinquency rate at the county level
and we obtain a number of predictors with the same level of disaggregation. Once we have
established a prediction model for our outcome we can predict the delinquency rate at the loan
level by using more disaggregated data from the HMDA.
From the county data we build a 3 years ahead average delinquency rate at the county level,
which will be used as the outcome of our prediction model. We obtain a number of explanatory
variables from the American Community Survey, the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau
of Labour Statistics.
Since the goal is to be able to predict the delinquency rate at the loan level we run the model
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including two sets of explanatory variables: i) regressors that we observe both at the county and
at the loan level; 2) regressors we only observe at the county level.
In order to find the best prediction model we estimate approximately 1000 models including
combinations of the predictors. For each model we split our sample keeping 75% of the counties
to estimate the model and 25% as out of sample fit and we estimate it 10 times. We evaluate the
models by the out of sample Mean Squared Prediction Error and pick the one with the lowest
MSPE. All models are estimated with and without time fixed effects.
More formally we estimate
DRi,t = β0 + β1X
1
i,t + β2X
2
i,t + β3X
1
i,j,tX
2
i,t + δt + i,t (3.6)
Where i denotes the county and X1 is a set of predictors that is aggregated at the county level
from the loan level data, whereas X2 is purely county level data. We include the interaction
term between the loan aggregated and the county level regressors to account for the covariances
between the two and eliminate potential bias when we move to the loan level prediction.
Once we have estimated this model we use the coefficient and produce the following loan level
prediction
DˆRi,j,t = βˆ0 + βˆ1X
1
i,j,t + βˆ2X
2
i,t + βˆ3X
1
i,j,tX
2
i,t + δˆt, (3.7)
where j denotes a loan. The specification of the prediction model is displayed in Table 3.2 in
the Appendix.
This procedure gives us an expected probability of default for all the loans in our sample.
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In order to use this as an outcome in our final stage we take the median forecasted probability
of default for each bank in every year. We estimate this model using the IV discussed in the
methodology section. The results of this procedure are displayed in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Regression table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Median PD Leverage Median PD Leverage Median PD
Leverage -0.0208∗∗ -1.174∗∗∗ -1.025∗∗∗
(0.00861) (0.434) (0.374)
IV ∆ Unemployment 6.099∗∗∗∗
(1.541)
IV ∆ Deposits -15.22∗∗∗∗
(3.510)
Non-Current Loans -0.125∗∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗
(0.00527) (0.0550) (0.00527) (0.0475)
Constant 2.592∗∗∗∗ 10.05∗∗∗∗ 14.26∗∗∗ 10.95∗∗∗∗ 12.74∗∗∗∗
(0.0884) (0.0378) (4.416) (0.181) (3.802)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 25050 25040 25040 25040 25040
R2 0.253 0.092 0.092
F (instr.excl.) 37.05 44.04
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Using this measure for risk taking yields results that are in line with the ones discussed in
the previous section. OLS underestimates the effect of leverage on risk taking for this measure
as well. Using the IV procedure yields a negative and significant effect of leverage ratio on risk
taking. This once again translates into a positive relationship between bank leverage and risk
taking. Our results do not differ between the two IV procedures. Using this risk measure, we
find that an exogenous one point increase in the leverage ratio of a bank will lead to roughly a
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one percentage point decrease in the median probability of default of loans issued by that bank.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper addresses the question of the causal effect of changes in leverage on banks’ risk
taking behaviour. We do so by constructing two instruments to overcome the endogeneity prob-
lems resulting from the potential simultaneity and reverse causality between risk decisions and
the deposit market conditions. We instrument exogenous changes in leverage by building two
instruments: i) one based on the geographical area unemployment changes; ii) one based on
the geographical area deposit supply changes. In both cases we aggregate them using the local
deposit share of banks.
We then build a new measure of risk taking behaviour based on the responsiveness of orig-
ination decisions to a measure of risk of loan applications (loan-to-income). We compute this
measure at the bank/year level and use it as our outcome.
Our empirical analysis suggests that exogenous increases in leverage incentivises banks to
take on more risk, i.e. to originate loans with riskier characteristics. We also employ a second
measure of risk, the median predicted probability of default of originated loans, and find that
higher levererage leads to a higher probability of default of issued loans. These results are
consistent with a limited liability and moral hazard story put forth by some of the theoretical
literature. They are novel in the empirical literature on leverage and risk taking, as previous
work has found no relation or a negative relationship between leverage and risk.
These results have relevant policy implications in that they suggest that any measure that
would reduce banks’ leverage would also decrease incentives to invest in risky assets, thereby
considerably reducing systemic risk.
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Appendix
Variable list
Table 3.1: Data for Prediction Model
VARIABLE SOURCE AVAILABILITY
median lti of originated loans for purchases or refinancing HMDA loan
median income of borrowers HMDA loan level
median borrowed amount HMDA loan level
median housing cost ACS county level
median housing cost to median income ACS county level
median income ACS county
share households with a second mortgage ACS county level
median value of a housing unit ACS county level
average monthly mortgage payment IRS ZIP code level
unemployment rate BLS county level
Data sources are:
HMDA - home mortgage disclosure act data
ACS - American Community Survey data
IRS - Internal Revenues Service
BLS - Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Delinquency rate prediction model
Table 3.2: Prediction Model
(1)
dr3c
Median lti of origin. loans -0.482
(0.686)
Median income of borrowers -0.0621∗∗∗
(0.0145)
Median household income 0.0000254
(0.0000144)
Med. housing cost to household inc. 315.1∗∗∗
(71.32)
% of households with 2nd mortg. 0.0417
(0.0343)
Average mortgage payments 0.000217∗
(0.000110)
Unemployment 0.0000428∗∗∗
(0.00000523)
Interaction terms YES
State fixed effects YES
Constant -1.223
(1.485)
N 1606
R2 0.793
Adj. R2 0.783
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 3.5: Median predicted probability of default; (average across banks in the final estimation
sample)
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